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Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn:
A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization
Plan
Thomas Merrillt & David M. Schizertt
A compelling case can be made for reducing America's consumption of
petroleum fuels. Nearly all analysts think that the way to slash consumption
of petroleum fuels is through an end-user tax. There is, however, widespread
public opposition to higher gasoline taxes. Furthermore,in a recession the
appropriatefiscal policy is to cut taxes, not to raise them. This paper
proposes a method of stabilizing petroleum fuel prices at a sufficiently high
level, without reducing aggregateconsumer purchasingpower. We introduce
a revenue-neutral petroleum fuel price stabilization plan, called the "PFPS"
plan for short Under this plan, a government surcharge on the price of oil
would phase in and out in an inverse relationship to changes in world oil
prices,such that retail prices would rise with increases in the price of oil but
would not appreciablyfall when the price of oil declines.Any levies collected
under the plan would be fully refunded to consumers pro rata. We describe
the advantages of such a plan relative to a Pigouvian tax or a program of
subsidies and regulatory mandates, as well as its disadvantages. One
advantage is that it might incur less political opposition than a tax, because
the share of GNP devoted to government would not change (given full
refundability), and the government would not be imposing a new cost on
voters, but only depriving them of contingent benefits associatedwith future
oil price declines.
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Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn

Introduction
A compelling case can be made for reducing America's consumption of
petroleum fuels. The combustion of petroleum fuels is associated with a
variety of external costs, most prominently, but not exclusively, the
emission of greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change. The fact
that nearly two-thirds of petroleum fuels are imported also has serious
implications for national security, by making the United States vulnerable
to supply interruptions, and by underwriting oil-rich dictatorships and
regimes hostile to American interests. Finally, the heavy dependence on
petroleum fuels threatens the economy, as oil price shocks have
contributed to three major recessions in the last forty years, including the
recession that began in 2008.
We do not believe that targeted government subsidies and regulatory
mandates represent an effective strategy for reducing petroleum fuel
consumption. The history of such efforts is not auspicious. Subsidies for oil
shale in the 1970s cost taxpayers billions of dollars with negligible results.
The Corporate Average Fuel Economy requirements for automobile
manufacturers, first imposed in the 1970s, promoted a shift from cars to
minivans and sport utility vehicles (SUVs), but have had at best a modest
impact on aggregate fuel consumption. More recent efforts to promote
ethanol production have probably resulted, on balance, in a net increase in
energy consumption. 1 Conceivably today's fashionable ideas, such as
subsidies for wind and solar power and for purchasing hybrid vehicles, will
fare better. But history suggests that Congress, which will ultimately
determine the beneficiaries of targeted subsidies and mandates, has no
comparative advantage in picking technological winners and losers.
Marching down this road again may result only in wasted resources and
further delay in achieving real progress.
Among serious policy analysts, there is nearly uniform support for the
proposition that the most efficient way to slash consumption of petroleum
fuels is to increase prices. Higher fuel prices should trigger millions of
individual adjustments on countless margins, involving which car to drive
out of the driveway, whether to make an extra trip to the store for that last
dinner item, whether to work at home one day a week, and the like. Over
the longer term, the response to higher prices should be even more
dramatic, as consumers make different decisions about what kind of car to
buy, where to live, and whether to form a car pool, and as entrepreneurs
and investors compete to develop promising alternative energy ventures.

1
See David Pimentel, Ethanol Fuels: Energy Balance, Economics, and Environmental
Impacts Are Negative, 12 NAT. RESOURCES REs. 127, 128 (2003) (estimating that "29% more energy
is used to produce a gallon of ethanol than the energy in a gallon of ethanol").
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Recent extreme swings in oil prices appear to corroborate these
predictions, at least for the short term. In the first half of 2008, world oil
prices soared, peaking at $147 per barrel in the summer,2 which caused
prices of gasoline at the pump to soar above $4.00 per gallon. 3 As fuel
prices rose, Americans drove fewer miles. 4 In the second half of 2008, a
major credit crisis plunged the world into a deep recession, and oil prices
collapsed. By December, prices had fallen to below $40 per barrels-an
amazing decline of more than two-thirds in under six months. Again, the
pricing system worked as predicted, and consumption of fuels began to
rise, even though the depressed state of the economy kept consumption
from reaching pre-recession levels. 6 In 2009, prices rebounded
substantially, although not to their prior highs.
Nearly all analysts think that the way to achieve a price increase that
would slash consumption is through an end-user tax. In an ideal world,
such a tax would be set at a level equal to the marginal social costs of
consuming petroleum fuels, which would cause consumers to "internalize"
these costs in making relevant decisions. This is referred to as a
"Pigouvian" tax, after the economist who first proposed corrective taxes of
this sort. 7 High end-user taxes are common elsewhere in the worldA and
have had the expected effect of reducing per capita consumption of
petroleum fuels relative to American levels. 9
The problem with pursuing this policy is widespread public
opposition to higher gasoline taxes in the United States.' 0 In the last

2

lad Mouawad, Wondering IfCrude Could FallEven More, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, at B1.

3

ENERGY

INFO.

ADMIN.,

MONTHLY

ENERGY

REVIEW:

NOVEMBER

2009,

at

122,

http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/mer/pdf/mer.pdf.
4
See Clifford Krauss, Drivers Take to the Road Again as Gas Prices Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2008, at B1.
5
Geoffrey Rogow, Citigroup,Ford Lead 5th Straight Decline, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2008, at
C5.
6
See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 3.
7
See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172-203 (4th ed. 1932). For a more recent
treatment, see, for example, WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY 21-23, 29 (2d ed. 1988).
8
See Bruce Crumley, Think Gas Is High? Try Europe, TIME, May 28, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/O,8599,1809900,00.html (noting that in May 2008,
taxes represented 70% of the price of gasoline in France and the United Kingdom, and only 11% in
the United States). Indeed, even China announced in December 2008 that it was increasing its
gasoline tax fivefold, from 0.2 yuan per liter (or approximately $0.15 per gallon) to 1 yuan per liter
(or approximately $0.65 per gallon). Michael Kitchen, China Plans Drastic Hike for Gasoline Taxes,
MARKETWATCH, Dec. 5, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/china-raise-gasoline-taxfive-fold/story.aspx?guid=%7B417ASOBB-2E4E-4BB8-8C17-AA8431743446%7D.
9
See Thomas Sterner, Fuel Taxes: An Important Instrumentfor Climate Policy, 35 ENERGY
POL'Y 3194 (2007) (estimating that Europe's policy of higher gas taxes than in the United States
has cut fuel demand in half.
10
See, e.g., Press Release, Nat'l Ctr. for Pub. Policy Research, Americans Cool to Global
Warming Action, New Poll Finds (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.nationalcenter.org/PRGlobalWarmingGasTax_Poll0308.html. For similar findings surveying Canadians, see Shi-Ling
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presidential election, no major candidate advocated raising petroleum fuel
taxes. The only significant discussion focused on whether to forgive these
taxes in a temporary tax "holiday."" The economic recession provides an
additional-and entirely legitimate-objection to higher fuel taxes. In a
recession the appropriate fiscal policy is to cut taxes in order to enhance
consumer purchasing power, not to raise taxes. Thus, even if a Pigouvian
gas tax is otherwise politically feasible, it is not a good idea to impose one
in the midst of a major recession.
What is needed is a method of stabilizing petroleum fuel prices at a
sufficiently high level without reducing aggregate consumer purchasing
power. This Article proposes to achieve these objectives with a revenueneutral petroleum fuel price stabilization plan, called the "PFPS" plan for
short. Our proposal offers many of the important benefits of a Pigouvian
fuel tax, but does not reduce aggregate consumer demand and, we believe,
has other important incentive effects and political advantages relative to a
Pigouvian tax.
The essential idea is to set a floor under the price of gasoline. If the
market price fell below this threshold, then consumers would pay an
additional levy on petroleum fuels (which we variously call a "charge" or
"contribution") to make up the difference. As world oil prices fell, the levy
would rise; conversely, as world oil prices rose, the levy would fall; when
world prices reached a high enough level, the levy would phase out
completely. The net effect, essentially, would be to keep petroleum fuel
prices from declining below the price floor. For example, suppose the PFPS
plan were designed to stabilize the price at a floor of $3.50 per gallon. If
world oil prices declined to the point where the market price fell to $3.00
per gallon, the PFPS contribution would kick in and raise the price by $0.50
per gallon. If world oil prices rose so that the market price were $3.75 per
gallon, the levy would kick out and the price would be $3.75.12

Hsu, Carbon Tax Heuristics and Politics: The Case of the Gasoline Tax (Apr. 15, 2008),

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121039.
11
See lulie Bosman, Unlikely Allies Campaign for a Gas-Tax Holiday, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
2008, at A18.
12
Our proposal is a "one-way" price stabilization system, which limits downward
movements in retail petroleum prices (associated with falling world oil prices) but does not
restrict upward movements (caused by rising world oil prices). This is because we are primarily
interested in internalization of social costs associated with excessive consumption. In theory, one
could also implement a "two-way" version of the plan, which would stabilize prices in the upward
direction as well, perhaps to maintain consumer confidence and avoid economic disruptions
caused by price shocks or asset bubbles. See Arvind Subramanian & John Williamson, Put the
Puritans

in

Charge

of

the

Punchbowl,

FT.coM,

Feb.

11,

2009,

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/d21fa536-fB50-1 ldd-aae8-000077b07658.html
(questioning
whether some sort of outer limits on the prices of commodities, housing, and other assets may be
needed to prevent repeated price bubbles). We are skeptical of the two-way version for a variety of
reasons, including concerns about the increased complexity of such a plan, how it would be funded,
and whether it would interfere with the microeconomic signals provided by the one-way version.
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It would be impractical to use the PFPS plan as a source of revenue for
government programs, and thus to convert the charges into a true tax. This
is because the contributions would be very unpredictable, depending on
the ups and downs of world oil prices. If the floor were set at $3.50 per
gallon and world oil prices returned to the levels reached in 2008, the PFPS
plan would generate zero revenue. In part for this reason, and in part to
eliminate any fiscal drag from the PFPS charges, we propose that any
revenues collected be fully refunded to consumers pro rata. This aspect of
the proposal (which we variously call "refunds" or "benefits") could be
administered by the IRS in a manner analogous to recent refundable credit
proposals. While consumers as a group would experience no net decline in
purchasing power under PFPS, individuals, of course, would be affected:
those who consume less than the average amount of gasoline would enjoy
a net benefit, while those who consume more would incur a net cost. Thus,
the aggregate effect of the PFPS plan would be to create a systematic and
long-term incentive to reduce petroleum fuel consumption with a neutral
fiscal impact.
What are the social policy implications of adopting this plan? Our
proposal would signal to consumers, auto manufacturers, and investors in
alternative energy technology that petroleum fuel prices would not decline
below the floor price in the future. Armed with this information,
consumers, manufacturers, and energy investors would commit to making
fundamental changes in their behavior and their investments in new
technology-without need of targeted government subsidies-because
they would know that their investments would not be undermined by a
future collapse in petroleum fuel prices. Such assurances are crucial, as
recent events have shown. If our proposal had been enacted in July 2008
with a floor price of $3.50 per gallon, it would have had an extraordinary
impact, keeping consumers focused on the need for more fuel-efficient cars
and preventing the failure of a host of alternative energy ventures. Yet
without a stabilization program in place, the wild fluctuation in oil prices in
2008 has left investors and consumers all the more wary of investing in
energy efficiency going forward. Recent announcements of cancellations of
new ethanol plants-notwithstanding large government regulatory
incentives and tariff protections for domestic ethanol production-make
the point only too clearly. 13
Our proposal also has significant political advantages over an ordinary
excise tax increase or a carbon tax. To the extent that opposition to gas
taxes is grounded in concerns that they will dampen private economic
activity or encourage the growth of government, the inability to harness
the PFPS plan as a stable source of government revenue and the refund

13
See Clifford Krauss, Ethanol,Just Recently a Savior, Is Struggling, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2009, at Al.

Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn
feature of the plan address these concerns. Moreover, if the floor on gas
prices were set below the level of gas prices when the program was
enacted-something that is easy to do when prices are high-then voters
could take comfort in the fact that they would never have to make any
payments under the program as long as oil prices did not decline. A policy
change that threatens to deprive voters of only a hypothetical future
benefit-in the form of falling gasoline prices-and that would be revenue
neutral if it did have this result, should encounter less opposition than
proposals like President Clinton's BTU tax of 1993, which promised to raise
everyone's energy bills in order to sustain government programs.14
Of course, if the price floor were set at a low level, the program would
have less impact. This likely would be the case if the plan were adopted at a
time when gas prices were low, and the price floor was kept at a level
below the market price. In response, our proposal could be adjusted in a
range of ways, although each presents a tradeoff between regulatory
impact and political feasibility. The minimal adjustment would be to index
the floor for inflation. Other options would include delaying
implementation of the program until gas prices reach a designated high
level; adopting a schedule that phases in a progressively higher floor over
time; or establishing an automatic reset mechanism that would cause the
floor to rise with rises in oil prices, but block retail prices from moving
back downward when oil prices fall. Yet even if all these options were
rejected, our proposal would still have some effect, even if adopted at a
relatively low level when oil prices were low. Moreover, once the program
was in place, if public acceptance grew, Congress could always revisit the
issue and raise the floor or adopt one of the options for progressively
raising the threshold. In that case, putting the program in place is a crucial
first step.
The core of our PFPS plan-the idea that an additional charge should
apply to energy purchases when market prices are low but not when they
are high-has been floated in one form or another by a variety of
commentators.1 5 A variant on the idea was also briefly proposed by the

14
For an excellent case study of the fate of the BTU tax, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 485-508 (4th ed. 2007). In addition to citing its environmental

advantages, the Clinton Administration sought to win support for the BTU tax primarily as a deficit
reduction measure, not to fund specific new programs. In this sense the argument was that the tax
was an alternative to reduced government spending.
15

Among academic commentators, see STEVEN STOFT, CARBONOMICS: HOW TO FIX THE

CLIMATE AND CHARGE IT TO OPEC 176-78 (2008); and Severin Borenstein, The Implications of a
Gasoline Price Floorfor the California Budget and Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Ctr. for the Study of
Energy

Mkts.,

Working

Paper

No.

182,

2008),

available

at

http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF/csemwp182.pdf. Among editorial writers, see Editorial, A
Price Floorfor Oil, FIN. TIMES, May 23, 2007, at 16; Thomas L. Friedman, Truth or Consequences,N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2008, at A21; Thomas L. Friedman, Win, Win, Win, Win, Win..., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,
2008, at WK8; Philip Gordon, An Improbable Curefor Oil Addiction, FIN. TIMES, May 12, 2006, at 13;
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Carter Administration in the late 1970s. 16 As far as we are aware, however,
no one has sought to spell out in any detail why such a proposal is justified,
and how it might be structured and implemented. That is the objective of
this Article.
Part I offers a summary of our proposal. Part II develops the
advantages of the proposal. Like a Pigouvian tax, our PFPS plan would
reduce consumption of gasoline, which would have positive effects on the
environment, national security, and urban sprawl and congestion. Yet, as
compared to a Pigouvian tax, it would stand a greater chance of gathering
political support, while also lending greater stability to petroleum fuel
prices. Moreover, because the PFPS contributions would be refunded, the
plan generally would not reduce consumer purchasing power or distort the
distribution of income or incentives to work and save.
Part III describes the plan's disadvantages, including the risk that it
would be repealed, and that consumers and producers would discount it
accordingly. We also consider the possibility that adopting a floor on the
price of gasoline would allow producers (including OPEC) to raise prices to
a level just above the floor, in effect expropriating the refund checks
consumers would otherwise receive. We show how this problem can be
avoided by pegging the program to global crude prices instead of local
retail prices, and by adjusting the contribution level monthly instead of
continuously. Finally, we highlight ways in which our PFPS plan is less
comprehensive than a Pigouvian carbon tax. It does not try to set
contributions equal to the marginal social harm caused by the relevant
externalities, as an ideal corrective tax would, and it also does not reach
some substitutes for gasoline, such as natural gas and coal.

Charles Krauthammer, At $4, Everybody Gets Rational,WASH. POST, June 6, 2008, at A19; Henry Lee,
Tame Oil's Wild Price Ride with a Tax, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 13, 2006, at 9; Robert 1.

Samuelson, Learning from the Oil Shock, NEWSWEEK, June 23, 2008, at 39; and Henry Blodget, Time
for a Gas Tax, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 11, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpostcom/henryblodget/time-for-a-gas-tax b_150230.html. Other relevant articles by Charles Krauthammer
include: Charles Krauthammer, Energy Fix: Pump the Oil, Raise the Tax, WASH. POST, June 20, 2003,
at A25; Charles Krauthammer, Tax and Drill, WASH. POST, May 21, 2004, at A25; Charles
Krauthammer, The Net-Zero Gas Tax, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 5-Jan. 12, 2009, at 16; and Charles
Krauthammer & Barbara Cubin, Should the U.S. Raise the Gas Tax?, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, Jan. 15,
2007, at 27.
16
See James N. Naughton, Carter Shaped Energy Plan with Disregard for Politics; He
Vowed to Curb Nation's Use of Fuel 'Even If It Costs Me Another Term,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1977, at 1
(recounting a Carter Administration proposal to impose successive five-cent increases in gas taxes
each time the country exceeded a national consumption goal; the taxes would be refunded in the
form of income tax credits). See generally Joseph J. Thorndike, Take It Away and Give It Back: The
History

of

Refundable

Gas

Taxes,

TAX

ANALYSTS:

TAX

HISTORY

PROJEcT,

http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/artweb/6b5 190 1d 52 94bebb85 2 5 71a20068ed15 ?
opendocument (tracing the history of the Carter proposal).
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I.

A Summary of the PFPS Plan

17
The federal excise tax on gasoline is currently 18.4 cents per gallon.
We propose to designate that tax rate as a minimum, and to provide for a
supplemental charge-the PFPS contributions-that would take effect in
the future to offset declines in the retail price of gasoline below a
designated floor. These PFPS contributions would ensure that consumers
pay at least this floor price for gasoline and other petroleum fuels in the
future, even if the price of oil fell.

A.

Setting the PriceFloor

There are three different ways in which the price floor could be
established. We will refer to these as the target price, the phase in, and the
automatic reset methods. We will begin with the target price, which is the
most straightforward of the options.
The target price method simply designates a specific retail price of
gasoline as an appropriate floor price in order to achieve downside price
stabilization. One plausible choice might be ten percent below the current
retail price of gasoline at the time the plan is adopted (for example, a floor
of $1.80 if the market price is $2.00). Under this approach, the plan would
impose no immediate out-of-pocket cost on taxpayers when enacted. A
variation on the target price approach would be to provide that the floor
takes effect if and when gasoline prices reach a certain level in the future.
For example, the plan could stipulate that when prices reach $3.80 per
gallon (on a national basis averaged over some months), a floor of $3.50 is
put into effect.
The target price would not necessarily have to be below the current
retail price at the time the PFPS plan is adopted. It could be set ten percent
above the current retail price, or even one hundred percent above the
current retail price, in which case the PFPS plan would result in an
immediate increase in the retail price of gasoline. If the plan were adopted
at a time when retail prices were low then it would make sense from a
policy perspective to set a target price at a higher level in order to
discourage consumption of petroleum fuels. We anticipate that, for reasons
of political acceptability, the plan would not take this form, but it is one
policy option. Whatever number is chosen as a target for the petroleum
fuel price floor, it should be subject to a cost of living adjustment each year
to preserve its real value.
A second variation would be to phase in the price threshold. Suppose
retail prices are $2.00 per gallon at the time the plan is adopted and the
appropriate price threshold for policy purposes is determined to be $3.50

17

26 U.S.C. § 4081(a)(2)(A)-(B) (2006).
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per gallon. The threshold could be set at $2.00 at the time the plan is
adopted and could be scheduled to increase in increments of, say, $0.10 per
gallon every quarter for the next fifteen quarters (three and three-fourth
years) until it reaches $3.50. This would ensure, at a minimum, that retail
prices would rise steadily over this period to the target price (they might
rise faster, of course, if world oil prices increased more rapidly). The phase
in approach might be appropriate if the plan were adopted at a time when
petroleum fuel prices were relatively low and policymakers wanted to
assure that consumers would have a period of time to adjust to the
prospect of higher future prices.
A third variation would be an automatic reset mechanism. This
approach would provide that the target price would trail the market price
and automatically reset to some increment below the retail price (say, ten
percent below) as market prices rose, but would not reset as market prices
fell. Thus, if market prices were $2.00 per gallon at the time the program
was adopted, the target would initially be set at $1.80. But if world oil
prices subsequently rose, such that they would cause the retail price to rise
to $2.50 per gallon, the target would reset to $2.25. Presumably the reset
mechanism would be capped at some level determined to reflect a price
that appropriately discourages petroleum fuel consumption (for example,
8
$3.50 per gallon).1
B.

Calculatingthe PFPS Charges

Although the goal is to maintain a floor on the retail price of
petroleum fuel, the actual calculation of the levy should be keyed to the
world price of crude oil for several reasons. First, crude oil prices are by far
the largest component of petroleum fuel prices, in recent years accounting
for as much as fifty-eight percent of the retail price of gasoline. 19 Second,
the world price of crude oil is determined by global forces of supply and
demand, which appear to be largely impervious to manipulation by
domestic refiners, distributors, or retailers. Third, using an input at the
beginning of the production process preserves the benefits of competition
among downstream suppliers, including refiners, interstate pipeline
companies, regional wholesalers, and retail service stations. Fourth, we
assume the PFPS contributions, like the current federal excise tax, will be
collected at the point of distribution of petroleum products to wholesale
distributors, so the levy cannot be imposed at the point of final sale to
consumers even if this is otherwise desirable.

18
We are grateful to Richard Richman for suggesting this automatic reset option.
19
See
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
A
PRIMER
ON
GASOLINE
PRICES
(2008),
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/brochures/gasolinepricesprimer2007/index.html.
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The exact amount of the PFPS contributions should be determined in
accordance with a formula, developed administratively, that seeks to
determine the relationship between crude oil prices and pump prices. For
example, to set the floor at a national average of $1.80 per gallon, we
should strip out taxes, including both the existing federal excise tax (which
would not change) and state and local taxes. Suppose this yields a national
average pre-tax retail price of $1.40 per gallon. Taking this figure, we
should then subtract an estimate for refining, distribution, and marketing
costs, including a normal profit on all these activities. This gives us the
crude oil component price of gasoline. Assume this is $0.64 per gallon, or
about $27 per barrel. Armed with this component price, we can now set the
PFPS contribution level. If world oil prices fell, say, to $22 per barrel, then
we would impose a levy of $5 per barrel. If world oil prices were $27 per
barrel or higher, there would be no PFPS contribution.
Under this approach, refining, distribution, and marketing costs
obviously have to be determined. The simplest method would be to
calculate these costs during a test year in the recent past. In 2007, for
20
example, the average amount of such costs was about $0.76 per gallon.
Whichever method is chosen, the objective would not be to fix the retail
price of gasoline, but to estimate as accurately as possible the crude oil
price component in the retail price of gasoline, and thereby to fix the
appropriate levy (if any).
Because the PFPS charges would be calculated based on the price of
crude oil, the actual price paid by consumers would vary somewhat from
region to region and station to station, depending on regional variations in
refining and distribution costs, the level of state and local gasoline taxes,
and whether the station is located in an area that has to use more
21
expensive reformulated gasoline under EPA Clean Air Act regulations.
We envision that the PFPS contributions would be applied to all
petroleum fuel products, not just gasoline sold to motorists. This would
achieve a greater impact, in terms of incentives for conservation and
development of alternative fuels. An initial approach, capitalizing on

20
Id. (calculation based on figures for 2007 average retail prices). A more refined
method is to determine the national average "reasonable" costs of refining, distribution, and
marketing. This can be done in a rulemaking proceeding using the kind of techniques that have
been developed to fix maximum reasonable public utility charges. An even more refined method is
to determine the "total service long-run incremental costs" for a hypothetical efficient provider of
refining, distribution, and marketing services, a technique followed by the Federal
Communications Commission in pricing unbundled network elements for purposes of pricing
competitive access in the telephone industry. See Ingo Vogelsang, Price Regulation of Access to
Telecommunications Networks, 41 J.ECON. LITERATURE 830, 840 (2003).
21
The average retail price of gasoline varies by $0.30-$0.40 per gallon between high
tax/high cost areas (for example, Los Angeles) and low tax/low cost areas (for example, Houston),
with most cities falling somewhere in between. See CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2008, at 477 tbl.711. We would expect a similar spread

to continue after the introduction of our proposed levy.
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existing administrative mechanisms, would be to impose the PFPS charges
on all fuels currently subject to federal excise taxes. Federal excise taxes
currently apply to gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation fuel, and motorboat fuel,
but not to natural gas, home heating oil, chemical feedstocks, or fuel used
on farms. From an environmental perspective, especially one that focuses
on climate change, this pattern is not ideal. But as experience with the
Clinton BTU tax reveals, the more comprehensive the program, the greater
the burden of interest group opposition. 22 The existing pattern of markets
subject to the excise tax, which emerged in its present form out of the
wreckage of the BTU tax effort, may be a rough guide to what is politically
achievable, at least on a first pass, given the constellation of interest groups
and their political clout. It also has a certain focal quality, since it is
grounded in the status quo, and thus may be useful in fending off proposals
for new exemptions. Finally, it has the administrative advantage of
piggybacking on the existing excise tax regime.
Although the relationship between crude oil prices and final refined
product prices might vary somewhat in different petroleum fuel markets,
we think the PFPS charges developed with reference to the retail gasoline
market could probably be adopted for use in all markets. If a more finetuned approach were desired, a different benchmark retail price and a
different levy could be calculated for each product. Later in the Article, we
will discuss the possibility of exempting other petroleum fuel markets, or
phasing in the extension to other markets, in order to reduce political
opposition to the program.
C.

PFPS Refunds

The PFPS charges would not be a true tax, in the sense that they would
be designed not to collect revenue, but rather to influence behavior.
Indeed, PFPS contributions would fluctuate from month to month, and
would often be zero, making them very undesirable as a source of
government revenue. For this reason, and to prevent fiscal drag, we would
propose that every dollar collected under the plan be refunded to
taxpayers. There are several issues to be considered about how such a
refund would be administered.
First, we believe the refund should be limited to individuals. Business
entities, including corporations, partnerships, subchapter S corporations,
and nonprofits, would not be eligible for PFPS refunds. This is based on the
supposition that the PFPS charges paid by these entities would be passed
along to individuals in the form of higher prices for consumers, lower
wages for workers, or lower returns for investors. Thus, refunding these
contributions to individuals is the right answer on the merits. It is also

22

See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 14, at 485-508.
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much easier to do. Devising a refund for businesses and nonprofit
organizations would raise administrative questions of great complexity,
given the vast differences in petroleum fuel consumption among firms, and
the extent to which firms, as opposed to individuals in the firms, pay for the
fuel (think of a taxi company or pizza delivery service). Allowing
organizations to claim PFPS benefits would also be subject to abuse, such
as the creation of multiple corporations to claim benefits, which would be
difficult to police.
Second, we believe the PFPS benefits to individuals should be as broad
based as possible. Thus, we would not link the refund to either the income
tax or the social security payroll tax. 23 Either approach denies PFPS
benefits to some retirees and unemployed persons, many of whom
purchase gas. Instead, PFPS benefits should be available to all individuals.
Although PFPS benefits can also be provided through a refundable tax
credit, the benefits will be more salient to taxpayers if provided through a
separate payment 2 4 that they receive periodically, perhaps quarterly.2 5
Third, the refund amount should be based on the total revenue
collected under the PFPS plan divided by the total number of Americans of
driving age. The "average" American would therefore receive PFPS benefits
that completely offset the additional charges she pays in PFPS
contributions, as well as the higher prices she pays for goods and services
that consume petroleum fuels and any reductions in her wages and
investment returns from petroleum-consuming businesses. For those who
consume at exactly the average level, the PFPS plan thus would have no net
effect (aside from the modest amount lost to the administrative costs of the
system). Those who consume less than the average would be rewarded
with a net payment, while those who consume more than the average
would incur a net cost. Redistributing to those who are energy efficient
creates the desired incentive effect.
Fourth, "persons of driving age" should be defined, for purposes of
PFPS benefits, to mean all persons who are old enough to drive in their
state of residence. This awards PFPS benefits to some persons who do not
drive. But since one purpose of the program is to discourage driving, the
incentives here are not inappropriate. Moreover, even those who do not

23

Cf HAMILTON PROJECT, BROOKINGS INST., A CARBON TAX SWAP TO MITIGATE GLOBAL CLIMATE

CHANGE (2007), http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/0carbontaxmetcalf
/10_carbontax metcalfpb.pdf (discussing a carbon tax scheme originally proposed by Gilbert E.
Metcalf in which the tax revenue is refunded to individuals through an earned income tax credit).
24
This is the same cognitive bias that causes taxpayers to value receiving a refund when
they file income tax returns instead of regretting that they over-withheld during the course of the
year.
25
Although it would be administratively simpler to mail only one check per year, a
reason to make the payments more frequent is to help potentially illiquid low-income taxpayers
who must pay PFPS charges throughout the year, and thus would not want to wait until year-end
to receive their refund.

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 27:1, 2010

drive would experience higher prices passed along by businesses that
purchase petroleum fuel products, and reduced wages and investment
returns from petroleum-consuming businesses. We recommend against
any adjustment for miles driven or number of vehicles owned, since these
adjustments undermine incentives to conserve.
Fifth, although we sometimes call these payments "benefits," we do
not intend for them to be taxable under the income tax (as social security
benefits are, for instance). Indeed, if refunds were taxed, but charges were
nondeductible, 26 our proposal would impose an unacceptable drain on
27
consumer purchasing power.
Finally, we believe our PFPS plan would not require new bureaucratic
agencies or significantly more government employees. The federal
petroleum fuel excise tax is currently collected at transfer racks where
refined petroleum products are offloaded from pipelines and vessels to
wholesale delivery trucks. 28 This arrangement could also be adopted for
the PFPS contributions. Substantially more money would be collected, but
the number of collections and the routine for assuring proper payment
need not change. PFPS benefits, meanwhile, should be processed by the
IRS, which already has a great deal of information about taxpayers. Very
little additional information would need to be provided, and it could be
offered in a short form. Processing these filings would marginally increase
the burden on the IRS. Perhaps the most significant new administrative
task would be the need for the IRS to compute the amount of the per capita
benefit payment for each period.
II.

Advantages of the PFPS Plan

Policy analysts frequently advocate substantial increases in the
federal gasoline tax as a way of discouraging the consumption of gasoline
and thereby reducing the negative externalities associated with such
consumption. An ideal Pigouvian tax would be set at a level equal to the
marginal social costs associated with petroleum fuel consumption, and
would thus internalize those costs to consumers, creating incentives for

26

Charges will be deductible for those individuals who purchase gasoline for business

purposes, since the charge will be included in the retail price and will not be separately stated. For
these taxpayers, the refunds should in fact be includible in taxable income to the extent of their

business-related gasoline deductions, on the theory that the deduction has been reversed. This
would necessitate some refinements to Schedule C for individual business income.
27
In any event, the label attached to the periodic payments should not determine their
tax treatment. If it helps secure better tax treatment (or, for that matter, better budgetary

accounting) to call these payments "refunds" rather than "benefits," then they should be called
refunds, since we view the label merely as political packaging.

28

See 26 C.F.R. § 48.4081 (2009). The legal incidence of the tax is imposed on the

statutory "producer," that is, the federally licensed wholesale distributor, not the end user. See
Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 205 (1975).
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more socially efficient consumption decisions. 29 These costs are extremely
difficult to compute with precision, and it is unlikely, as a practical matter,
that the government would be able to do so. Historical experience with
environmental taxes suggests that even though policymakers have been
aware of the potential cost internalization case for such taxes, no attempt
has been made to equate the level of taxes with some measure of social
costs because of the many conceptual and measurement difficulties in
3
doing so. 0
Consider in this regard two of the major social costs that any increase
in petroleum fuel prices seeks to internalize: the emission of greenhouse
gases contributing to climate change, and the national security effects of
dependency on imported oil. Even if there is a strong scientific consensus
that greenhouse gases contribute to climate change, there is no consensus
on the magnitude of the welfare effects of this change. This measurement
problem is greatly compounded by the fact that climate change produces
both welfare costs and welfare benefits, and these effects do not overlap
geographically, creating imponderable normative questions about how to
weigh one against the other. 3 1 There is also the question of whether or to
what extent future costs net of benefits from climate change should be
discounted to their present value. The choice of a discount rate, which
again is a sharply contested normative question, makes net costs either
enormous or effectively zero. 3 2 With respect to national security, many
people share the intuition that America's dependence on imported oil has
made it more likely that we will get embroiled in wars in the Middle East,
and that it is undesirable for the United States to spend billions of
consumer dollars, directly or indirectly, to prop up existing regimes in
countries like Iran, Russia, and Venezuela. But no one has attempted to
quantify these costs. 33 And there are some offsetting national security
benefits from cheap petroleum fuel, such as dispersing the population so as
34
to make it less vulnerable to a terrorist attack.

29
See, e.g., Ian W.H. Perry & Kenneth A. Small, Does Britain or the United States Have the
Right Gasoline Tax?, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1276, 1276-77 (2005) (seeking to calculate the optimal

Pigouvian tax on gasoline based on the social costs of various externalities).
See Thomas A. Barthold, Issues in the Design of Environmental Excise Taxes, 1. ECON.
30
PERSP., Winter 1994, at 133 (reviewing historical experience with environmental taxes).
31
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentat
available
48-52
(2007),
REPORT

report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (analyzing possible costs and benefits of climate change according to
region).
32
For a discussion of the appropriate discount rate to use in evaluating
intergenerational benefits, see David Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting
the Future: A Guide for the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 433 (2009).
33
Cf. PAUL N. LIEBY, ESTIMATING THE ENERGY SECURITY BENEFITS OF REDUCED U.S. OIL IMPORTS

(2007) (quantifying economic costs of energy insecurity, but not other costs).
To cite another difficulty, the marginal social harm would change with the overall
34
level of gasoline consumption. As a result, as Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have observed, the
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Consequently, our PFPS plan-and, we suspect, any other proposal
that raises the price of petroleum fuels-is not based on any quantitative
estimate of social costs, as would be true of an ideal Pigouvian tax. The
degree to which prices should be raised to constrain these costs is a matter
of judgment, and must ultimately be determined politically. Our intuition is
that a price floor in the range of $3.50 to $4.00 per gallon is roughly where
one would want to start (if only because this price level had a notable effect
on consumption in 2008), but we claim no special expertise in selecting the
appropriate number. That is for the political system to decide, with input
from persons better qualified than we are to attempt at least a partial
measurement of the total social costs.
Wherever the price floor is set, our proposal shares many important
benefits of an equivalent Pigouvian tax. When gas prices would otherwise
fall below the floor, our proposal would force consumers to internalize the
difference between the market price and the price with the PFPS
contribution, which at least partially reflects the social costs of petroleum
fuel consumption. And, like a Pigouvian tax, our proposal would seek to
change behavior by changing prices, rather than by having the government
impose regulatory mandates or pick and choose which alternatives to
subsidize.
At the same time, our PFPS plan has distinct advantages relative to a
Pigouvian tax. First, and most importantly, a revenue-neutral PFPS plan
has political advantages over a Pigouvian tax, since in most versions it
would not impose immediate costs on voters (as long as the threshold is
set below the market price on the date of enactment). Second, our proposal
would create a stable floor on the price of gasoline, and thus should prove
more effective than a Pigouvian tax in persuading consumers and
alternative energy producers to make energy-saving investments. Third,
the fact that our proposed PFPS charges are fully refundable means that
they should neither reduce consumer purchasing power in a time of
economic contraction nor reduce incentives to work or save. Fourth, we
believe the PFPS plan should not be regressive.
A.

The PFPS Plan as a Second-Best Pigouvian Tax

Our PFPS plan, like a Pigouvian tax, reduces consumption of
petroleum fuels relative to the levels that would prevail absent the plan.
Indeed, PFPS contributions function like a classic Pigouvian tax when
petroleum fuel prices fall below the threshold (although, of course, the
level of these contributions would not be perfectly calibrated to the social
harm).

optimal corrective tax is probably not linear. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority
of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation,4 AM. L.& ECON. REV. 1 (2002).
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1.

Three Familiar Reasons to Reduce Consumption of Petroleum
Fuels
a.

Environment

Global warming has been called the most serious environmental issue
of our age. 35 Emissions of CO2 are significant contributors to the
greenhouse effect, which scientists believe is at least partially responsible
for the gradual rise in global temperatures we are currently experiencing.
Combustion of gasoline by motor vehicles, in turn, is a major source of CO2
emissions. Motor vehicle emissions account for approximately one-third of
all greenhouse gas emissions in the United States 36 and ten percent of all
global emissions of CO2.37 As the Supreme Court has noted, considering just
emissions from the transportation sector, the United States would "rank as
the third-largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world, outpaced only by
the European Union and China." 38 There is no known technology for
reducing CO2 emissions by motor vehicles other than burning less carbonbased fuel. This can be achieved either by improving fuel efficiency, driving
fewer miles, or switching to some alternative source of fuel, like electricity
generated by means other than carbon fuels.
Our PFPS plan would significantly reduce emissions of CO2 in the
United States. By placing a floor under the price of petroleum fuels, it
would encourage consumers to drive less, join carpools, work from home,
relocate to areas better served by public transportation, and purchase
more fuel-efficient cars. It would encourage vehicle manufacturers to
redesign their fleets to achieve greater fuel economy and eventually to run
on sources of power other than gasoline, including hydrogen, solar energy,
and rechargeable batteries. Businesses would reduce transportation costs
in countless ways, many beyond our current imagination. Anticipating
these trends, producers of alternative fuels would redouble their efforts to
develop new sources of power that are not subject to the levy and that
presumably do not generate equivalent greenhouse gases. The ultimate

35

See, e.g., Burton Richter, Learning What Fuel To Burn, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2001, at 19

(expressing a Nobel Laureate's view that "[nJearly all scientists" believe that global warming is
"the most serious environmental threat").
36

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-

2006,
at
ES-8
(2008),
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads/08-CR.pdf.

available

at

37
KEVIN A BAUMERT, TIMOTHY HERZOG & JONATHAN PERSHING, WORLD RES. INST., NAVIGATING
THE NUMBERS: GREENHOUSE GAS DATA AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 63 (2005), available at

http://pdf.wri.org/navigating-numbers.pdf.
38

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524-25 (2007).
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impact is impossible to predict with any precision and would depend, of
course, on the level of the price floor. 39
Climate change is, however, only the beginning of the environmental
story associated with the combustion of petroleum fuels. Internal
combustion engines also emit carbon monoxide, particulate matter,
nitrogen oxides, and hydrocarbons. Nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons
combine with volatile organic compounds in the presence of sunlight to
produce ground level ozone. Carbon monoxide, particulates, and ozone
each present serious human health risks. One study by researchers at the
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, for example, concluded
that reducing ozone pollution by thirty-five percent would prevent about
four thousand deaths annually in the United States. 40 Tailpipe emission
controls on new automobiles in place since 1977 have produced
substantial improvements in ambient air concentrations of carbon
monoxide and particulates, and, to a lesser degree, nitrogen dioxide. 41 But
ozone has been more resistant to improvement, in large part because
reductions in emissions of hydrocarbons per mile traveled have been offset
42
by a steady increase in the number of miles driven in the United States.
Our PFPS plan, by imposing a floor on the price of gasoline, could
achieve significant additional improvements in air quality associated with
motor vehicle pollution. It could do this for two reasons. First, the amount
of combustion of motor fuel would fall. Given higher expected prices of
gasoline, consumers would increasingly switch to cars that burn less fuel
and would alter their behavior in countless ways to cut back on the
number of miles they drive. Second, the higher prices of gasoline would
create an incentive for more rapid turnover of the existing vehicle fleet, as
consumers shift from older, less efficient models, to newer, more efficient
models. Older models are disproportionately responsible for emitting the
hydrocarbons that produce ozone, as well as other pollutants. 43 In a fairly

39
Borenstein, supra note 15, at 5, 11, estimates, using California data, that raising the
price of gasoline from $2.50 to $3.00 per gallon would reduce greenhouse gas emissions from

transportation sources by nine percent over the long run.
40
Michelle L. Bell et al., Ozone and Short-Term Mortality in 95 US Urban Communities,
1987-2000, 292 J.AM. MED. ASS'N 2372, 2376 (2004).
41
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 21, at 223 tbl.359; see Sajal S.

Pokharel, Gary A. Bishop & Donald H. Stedman, Emissions Reductions as a Result of Automobile
Improvement, 37 ENVTL. Sc. & TECH. 5097, 5100 (2003) ("[llmprovements in emissions control
technologies have played a significant role in lowering fleet average on-road automobile
emissions.").
42
See
U.S.
ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY,
http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/PlOOOlK9.pdf.

43
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short time, we would see measurable improvements in air quality and a
44
decline in respiratory diseases and other health effects of auto pollution.
b.

NationalSecurity

Reducing our consumption of petroleum fuel also makes our nation
more secure. 45 Much has changed since the end of World War I, when the
United States was almost completely self-sufficient in energy, producing all
the oil, coal, and other fuels it needed to power the world's largest
economy. The United States still has ample coal supplies. But today,
roughly two-thirds of the domestic demand for petroleum products is
supplied by imports. 46 It would be one thing if the world's oil supply came
from stable democracies that could be counted on to remain reliable
trading partners with the United States and our allies. In reality, the picture
is quite disturbing. After Canada and Mexico, the largest sources of U.S. oil
imports are Saudi Arabia (519 million barrels per year), Venezuela (416
million barrels per year), Nigeria (381 million barrels per year), Iraq (202
million barrels per year), Angola (187 million barrels per year), and Algeria
(130 million barrels per year).4 7 Russia and Iran are also important global
suppliers. These are countries either led by dictators, experiencing war or
significant internal discord, or overtly hostile to the interests of the United
States. Furthermore, the strategic petroleum reserve will not suffice to
replace any major disruption in imports. The reserve has 689 million
barrels of oil-not even enough to offset one year's supply from Saudi
48
Arabia and Venezuela.
We do not suggest that the PFPS plan offers "energy independence"
for the United States, nor do we think such independence is desirable.
What it would do, however, is reverse a steady progression of increased
reliance on imported oil, in which countries hostile to the United States
perceive that we are increasingly dependent on them. This has
emboldened these countries to take actions contrary to our national
interests. A decline in domestic consumption would change this dynamic at
the margins, as the United States switched from increasing dependence to
greater independence. For example, an American threat to embargo oil
imports from these countries would become more credible. In addition, a
decline in American consumption would lead to a price decline in the

44
In contrast to the effect of our proposal on the emission of greenhouses gases, the
impact on emissions of conventional pollutants would be of immediate benefit and thus would not
pose the same conundrums about selecting an appropriate discount rate.
45
See generally COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT No. 58,
NATIONAL
SECURITY
CONSEQUENCES
OF
U.S.
OIL
DEPENDENCY
(2006),
available at
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/EnergyTFR.pdf.
46
47
48

CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 21, at 582 tbl.902.
Id. at 581 tbl.901.
Id. at 582 tbl.902.
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global market. This would serve to transfer resources from oil-producing
nations, which are often unfriendly, as noted above, to oil consumers,
49
including allies such as the European Union and Japan.
Environmental and national security goals are not always in sync. For
example, a broad-based carbon tax that discourages the use of both
petroleum and coal has beneficial environmental consequences, but works
against our desire for more energy independence, given our vast reserves
of domestic coal. In the case of our PFPS plan, however, there is no tension
between these objectives. Reduced consumption of gasoline and related
fuels is good for the environment, and also promotes energy independence.
c.

Urban Sprawl and Congestion

Petroleum fuel consumption is also the source of a third important
externality. Inexpensive motor vehicle transportation has facilitated
suburban and exurban sprawl.5 0 In a vicious cycle, this pattern of growth
has further encouraged the use of motor vehicles, since alternative modes
of transportation, such as walking, bicycling, or public transportation, are
impossible or inconvenient in suburbs and exurbs. Urban sprawl has a
number of undesirable social consequences, including longer commutes,
greater segregation of people by race and class, gradual destruction of
agricultural lands and woodlands, and larger homes that consume more
energy and have larger carbon footprints. Putting a floor on the price of
gasoline would begin to reverse the process of sprawl. People would prefer
housing closer to employment centers and public transportation. Over
time, cities would become denser.
Inexpensive motor vehicle transportation is also responsible for
increasing traffic congestion, leading to time wasted in traffic jams and
more accidents. 5 ' Heavy vehicles, made economically feasible by cheap
motor fuel, pose a particular safety threat to the occupants of other
vehicles. According to one study, the cost of congestion-induced accidents
alone would justify a Pigouvian tax of $220 billion annually.5 2 The full

49
China would also benefit from this change, and China's relationship with the United
States is more complicated. An argument against our proposal is that American consumers would
make sacrifices, and American businesses would see their costs increase, but some of the benefit
from this effort would redound to significant economic competitors such as China. Yet, if the PFPS
program does in fact prompt a green tech boom in the United States, then it could bolster the U.S.
competitive position by facilitating exports of this alternative energy technology.
50
See Jeremy R. Meredith, Sprawl and the New UrbanistSolution, 89 VA. L. REv. 447, 475
(2003).
51
Insurance data strongly suggest that increased congestion translates into higher
accident rates, more personal property damage, and more personal injuries. Aaron S. Edlin & Pinar
Karaca-Mandic, The Accident Externality from Driving,114 J.POL. ECON. 931 (2006).
52
Id. at 951.
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measure of externalities associated with sprawl and congestion is
unquestionably much higher.
Admittedly, our PFPS plan is an imperfect type of tax to capture these
external costs, since consumers might reduce expenditures on gasoline by
purchasing more fuel-efficient cars rather than relocating closer to urban
centers or taking public transportation. But some substitution away from
driving would likely occur, and this would help reduce the external costs
associated with sprawl and congestion.
2.

Advantages of Using Price Signals to Influence Behavior

There are a number of ways to discourage gasoline consumption, and
thus to attain the environmental, national security, and congestionreducing benefits discussed above. A great advantage of our proposal is
that it would not require the government to choose a particular approach
at the expense of others, something the government is not well-suited to
do.
a.

Information and Incentive Problems Facedby the Government

We may ultimately wean ourselves from our dependence on
petroleum fuels without any sacrifice in our standard of living through
technological innovations. There are numerous possible ways to do this.
We obviously do not know which new technology will turn out to be most
cost-effective and user-friendly, and which changes in lifestyle will be most
attractive. Different responses will appeal to different people. In the face of
these manifold uncertainties, we seriously doubt that government officials
have the information needed to make reliable predictions about which
technologies or practices will prove most successful. In particular,
members of Congress-who are the key actors in adopting a
comprehensive energy plan-do not have the expertise to assess whether
solar or wind energy is more promising, or whether consumers will prefer
electric cars to hybrids, high efficiency diesels, or natural gas cars-or,
53
more precisely, which types of consumers would prefer which product.
In addition to these information problems, government officials also
may not have the right incentives. If a suboptimal technology is backed by a
powerful interest group, government officials may feel pressured to

53

Under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1341, 119 Stat. 594, 1038-

49, Congress provided subsidies (in the form of tax credits) for purchasing hybrid vehicles. The
subsidies are based on a variety of factors, including energy efficiency, weight, and other
characteristics, and they phase out when a manufacturer has sold more than sixty thousand hybrid
vehicles. A recent study concludes that the implicit price American taxpayers are paying for saving
one gallon of gasoline under this Act ranges from $0 (for popular Toyota models, which have been
phased out) to $5.59 (for the bulky Chevrolet Tahoe Hybrid, which gets twenty-two miles per
gallon). Martin A. Sullivan, Tech Neutrality, Tax Credits,and the Gas Tax, 122 TAx NOTES 619, 621
tbl.1 (2009). It is unlikely that future subsidy programs will avoid similar irrationalities.
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support it. The experience with ethanol is not encouraging in this regard. It
is a familiar point that ethanol's appeal may derive more from its support
among farm-state senators than from its merits. Ethanol is expensive and
requires a great deal of energy to produce, once the energy needs of
farmers and delivery vehicles are considered; indeed, because ethanol is
water-soluble, it cannot be transported by pipeline, which uses water to
separate batches of product. Consequently, ethanol must be transported by
truck or rail. In addition, there is widespread concern that its use is driving
54
up food prices.
Another apt illustration of the incentives problem is provided by the
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) program adopted by Congress in
1975 in response to the Arab oil embargo and the ensuing energy crisis.55
Strengthening the CAFE program in order to reduce fuel consumption is
widely touted by politicians as an alternative to raising prices. What is not
appreciated is that although the American auto industry initially opposed
the CAFE program, the industry and the United Auto Workers (UAW) union
were able to influence the form the program took in ways that served their
perceived interests. We will highlight three features of the regulatory
design of the CAFE program that rendered it largely worthless as an energy
conservation program. 5 6 Even a modest increase in fuel prices would
57
unquestionably do better.
First, the statute directed the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), the implementing agency, to differentiate
between "cars" and "light trucks," in response to pleas from manufacturers
that they needed to be able to produce pickup trucks that would get lower
fuel mileage than cars.5 8 The light truck category, however, was defined

54
See William Tucker, Carbon Limits, Yes; Energy Subsidies, No, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2008,
at All ("Biofuels have already proven to be... [a] disaster. They've gobbled up 30% of our corn
crop and have leveled tropical forests, while replacing less than 3% of our oil.").
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See Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901-19 (2006).
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The following discussion draws upon Federico Boffa et al., CAFE-The Corporate
Average
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Economy
Mandate
(Nov.
25,
2008),
available
at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/Haddoc.Bad-Public- GoodsCAFE-YaleDraft-200
8-11-25.pdf. For an earlier assessment, see ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE
135 (1986) (concluding that "the improvement in fuel economy for the industry was very close to
what would have been expected without the CAFE standards").
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See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC & BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF: FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS
VERSUS A GASOLINE TAX (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=5159&type=l. A

recent paper estimates that increased gasoline taxes would reduce consumption for about onesixth the economic cost of an equally effective change in CAFE standards. Mark R. Jacobson,
Evaluating U.S. Fuel Economy Standards in a Model with Producer and Household Heterogeneity
(Apr. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale journal on Regulation); cf Pinelopi
Koujianou Goldberg, The Effects of the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency Standards in the U.S., 46 J.
INDUS. ECON. 1, 28-29 (1998) (estimating that CAFE standards saved nineteen million gallons of fuel
per year, or 0.0001% of annual U.S. gasoline consumption).
58
Boffa et al., supra note 56, at 3.
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solely in terms of weight rather than function.5 9 The upshot, which in
hindsight seems inevitable, is that American companies cleverly
transformed their vehicle lines away from cars toward a new generation of
"light trucks," consisting of minivans and SUVs.60 European and Japanese
manufacturers quickly caught on and followed suit. As a result, the average
weight of vehicles purchased by American consumers under the CAFE
regime increased rather than decreased, 61 and fuel economy goals
62
suffered.
Second, with respect to the "car" side of the equation, the UAW
insisted that American manufacturers not be allowed to count imports
from their foreign affiliates in computing corporate average mileage. 63 This
provision was designed to force American firms to build their own new line
of small cars in addition to the large cars they had traditionally specialized
in producing, thereby preserving American manufacturing jobs. The upshot
was that American manufacturers rushed to market with a new generation
of more fuel-efficient autos (such as the GM X-body car and the Chrysler K
car). These models, however, had severe quality problems that arguably
proved the undoing of the American auto industry, as consumers lost
64
confidence in American brands.
But there was another, less appreciated consequence of the corporate
average provision. The corporate averages were set at levels designed to
allow the American firms barely to meet them, assuming the production
and sale of a new generation of small cars. Meanwhile, European and
Japanese manufacturers had no trouble meeting the corporate averages
with their existing line of mostly small cars. 65 In effect, they had a
considerable "cushion" under the corporate averages. Again, in what seems
fully predictable in hindsight, the foreign producers responded by
significantly and steadily increasing the size of cars in their fleets sold in
the United States. 66 Consider, for example, the growth in the size and
weight of the Honda Accord or the Toyota Camry over the years the CAFE
program has been in effect, not to mention the introduction of new luxury
divisions like Lexus. In effect, American consumers did not switch from
large American cars to small American cars, but from large American cars
to large imported cars. Again, fuel economy goals were undermined.
59
60
61
62
63
64

Id.
Id. at 26-27.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 26-28.
Id. at 5.
See Fred Mannering & Clifford Winston, Brand Loyalty and the Decline of American

Automobile Firms, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONoMICS 67, 88-93 (Martin

Neil Bailey & Clifford Winston eds., 1991) (examining the decline in market share of American
brands as a consequence of a decline in brand loyalty).
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Boffa et al., supra note 56, at 22-23.
66
Id. at 23-24.
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Third, Congress directed that the CAFE program was to be enforced by
67
NHTSA, a small agency that deals solely with auto manufacturers.
Perhaps not surprisingly, NHTSA implemented the program in ways that
largely responded to the interests of the regulated industry. For example,
NHTSA declined to make upward adjustments in the corporate averages
for either autos or light trucks for twenty-five years (from 1985 to 2010).68
Only recently, in response to the recent spike in petroleum prices, did
Congress intervene and mandate increases in corporate fuel averages
starting with the 2011 model year.69 NHTSA's passivity, which again seems
predictable given public indifference during a period of low petroleum fuel
prices, largely neutralized the Act as a force for energy conservation.
One can of course respond that CAFE's problems can be corrected by
drafting a better statute. But this misses the point. Any attempt to achieve
energy goals through targeted subsidies and regulatory mandates will be
shaped by interest groups, which inevitably have higher stakes in the
outcome and more information about the relevant variables than do
ordinary citizens and members of Congress. And any system of subsidies
and mandates will be gamed by the relevant interest groups in order to
advance their own interests, without regard to whether these responses
contribute to the policy goals that motivated the enactment of the subsidy
or the mandate in the first place.
b.

Consumer Incentives

Our PFPS plan would largely avoid these problems, since the key
decisions would be made by consumers and producers, instead of by the
government. By setting a floor on the price of gasoline, the plan would
encourage consumers to reduce their consumption of petroleum fuel, but
would leave the choice to individuals about how to do it. Some would move
closer to work, others would telecommute or carpool, while still others
would experiment with new technologies. Indeed, we know that
consumers respond to the price of gasoline, since there were significant
changes in behavior when gas prices rose precipitously in 2008-including
greater use of mass transit and steep declines in the demand for SUVsand a reversal of these changes in behavior when prices fell. 70 The virtue of
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On NHTSA, see generally JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY (1990).
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See OFFICE OF TRANSP. & AIR QUALITY, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, LIGHT-DUTY AUTOMOTIVE
TECHNOLOGY AND FUEL ECONOMY TRENDS: 1995 THROUGH 2007, at iii (2007).
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See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 102, 121
Stat. 1492, 1498-1501; see also John M. Broder, House, 314-100, Passes Broad Energy Bill; Bush To
Sign It Today, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2007, at 24.
70
See Michael Cooper, Transit Use Hit Five-Decade High in 2008 As Gas Prices Rose, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2009, at A13 (noting an increase in the use of mass transit in 2008); Chris Woodyard,
Small Used CarsAren't Big Sellers, USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 2009, at 1A (noting a decline in large vehicle
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price-based approaches like our PFPS proposal is that there does not have
to be a one-size-fits-all solution. The mix of costs and benefits associated
with different technological innovations will appeal differently to different
people, and they will gravitate to the innovations they prefer.
c.

ProducerIncentives

The PFPS proposal would have useful effects on producers as well.
Auto manufacturers, for instance, would focus their efforts on fuel-efficient
cars, knowing that the levy would keep gas prices from falling below a
minimum level. One of the significant challenges manufacturers face is that
they must design products well in advance of bringing them to market, and
uncertainties about the price of fuel leave them unsure about whether to
focus on gas-guzzling SUVs or small hybrids. Our PFPS contributions would
set a stable price floor, allowing the auto industry to focus on fuel
efficiency.
At the same time, producers of alternative energy would feel more
secure investing in the research and development that is needed for
breakthrough innovations. It is a familiar point that, over the past decades,
investors have periodically focused on developing alternative energy, but
their investments have repeatedly been wiped out as oil prices have
declined. Unfortunately, this happened again to many ventures in 2008.
Our PFPS plan would reassure investors that this will not happen again.
The result would be a vibrant and competitive market, in which different
technologies are developed and different approaches compete to reduce
our dependence on gasoline.
d.

A Market-BasedApproach

Unlike credits for ethanol, wind, solar power, and hybrid cars, and
other targeted subsidies, or regulatory mandates like the CAFE program,
our PFPS plan would not require the government to make judgments about
which types of conservation or alternative energy to support. The only
decision the government would make is where to set the price floor.

sales in 2008 due to high gasoline prices and a subsequent rebound). A recent study shows that
automobile manufacturers make large compensating adjustments in the prices of cars in response
to changes in the price of gasoline, cutting prices on inefficient vehicles when fuel prices rise, and
raising prices on inefficient vehicles when fuel prices fall (and vice versa for efficient vehicles).
This behavior is consistent with the proposition that automobile manufacturers believe consumers
respond to changes in fuel prices. See Ashley Langer & Nathan H. Miller, Automakers' Short-Run
Responses to Changing Gasoline Prices and the Implications for Energy Policy (Sept. 2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Journal on Regulation). The authors of that study
further note that this pricing behavior dampens the short-run price elasticity of demand for
gasoline, since much of the effect of fuel price changes is offset by changes in vehicle prices. In the
long run, however, higher fuel prices will result in a shift by manufacturers toward more fuelefficient cars, since their return on investment in such vehicles will be higher.
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Indeed, the conventional wisdom among environmental economists is that
gasoline taxes are preferable to direct regulation when the information
needed to set the tax is easier to get than the information needed to decide
among competing technologies. 71 As discussed, the amount of information
needed to set an appropriate price floor is impossibly large, with the result
that it will inevitably be somewhat arbitrary where the floor is set. But the
amount of information needed to adopt the right mix of technological
innovations is even larger.
Our proposal also avoids the line-drawing problems associated with
targeted subsidies and regulations. With CAFE standards, we need to know
what a car is, as opposed to a light truck, and, as discussed, this line has
been gamed in regrettable ways. The proposal further avoids the question
of whether to grandfather older technologies. The PFPS plan would apply
to a gallon of gas, regardless of who is buying it or what sort of car they will
use to consume it. As a result, our proposal would not create perverse
incentives to keep old and less energy efficient technologies, a problem
that arises when regulations are enacted prospectively with broad
grandfathering. There would also be less temptation to cater to wellconnected interest groups at the expense of the policy merits.
Our proposal shares the flexibility of a cap-and-trade program, but
would be easier to administer for petroleum fuels. A cap-and-trade
program, in most versions, sets a limit on the total tonnage of greenhouse
gases that can be generated, and creates a market in which generators of
greenhouse gases bid for the right to emit CO2 and similar gases. The virtue
of a cap-and-trade program is that generators can make their own choices
about whether and how to achieve emissions reductions, just as under our
PFPS proposal they can decide whether and how to reduce emissions by
conserving gas. But it is difficult to see how a cap-and-trade program can
be applied to consumer decisions to purchase petroleum fuels without
generating enormous transaction costs. Any cap-and-trade system is
therefore likely to be limited to major generators of greenhouse gases like
power plants. Yet it is not plausible that placing all of the burden of carbon
reduction on power plants is sufficient to achieve climate change
objectives. Our proposal is thus a useful complement to a cap-and-trade
program for stationary sources.
B.

PoliticalAdvantages of a Price Floor over a Pigouvian Tax

While a classic Pigouvian tax can also be a valuable complement to a
cap-and-trade program, our proposal has significant advantages over a
Pigouvian tax. We start with political feasibility.
71
See generally Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 34, at 2 (arguing that corrective taxes
"harness firms' information about control costs, making possible a result in which the level of the
externality is optimal (or more nearly so)").
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1.

Political Limitations of a Classic Pigouvian Gas Tax: Salient Costs

At one level, it is puzzling that gasoline taxes are so politically
unpopular in the United States. Strong policy arguments can be made in
favor of such taxes, and voters in other countries obviously support them.
In addition, by discouraging negative externalities, the tax should create a
surplus that can be used to attract interest group support. For example, a
gas tax can lead to less traffic, safer roads, lower auto insurance premiums,
and the repeal of counterproductive regulations such as the CAFE
standards. It can also lead to reductions in defense spending, and thus
permit tax cuts or free up resources for other government priorities.
Yet gas taxes face more of an uphill battle in the United States than in
other jurisdictions, for two reasons. First, unlike Europe and Japan, the
United States was an oil exporter after World War II, when significant
infrastructure and urban design decisions were made. 72 Since the supply of
fuel was abundant, U.S. cities were laid out expansively-something that
was possible in a sprawling nation that spans a continent-and mass
transit was not as high a priority as it had to be elsewhere. There was no
collective memory of fuel shortages, as there was in Europe and Japan. As a
result, much of the United States became locked into a lifestyle that
depends heavily on the automobile.
Second, U.S. political institutions are more attuned to public opinion,
for better or worse, than are the parliamentary systems of Europe and
Japan. Since our politicians run as individuals, they are particularly focused
on the exigencies of fundraising and on popular opinion. As a result, the
fact that there would be real pain associated with diminishing our reliance
on gasoline is a salient concern to our government officials, as is the fact of
interest group opposition.
Given these infrastructural and political realities, there is no mystery
why command and control strategies succeed politically while Pigouvian
taxes fail. The costs of regulations are not explicitly tied to the regulatory
mandate, but instead are quietly passed on by manufacturers in the form of
higher prices or lower wages and investment returns, while subsidies are
financed by reductions in other government expenditures, higher general
tax rates, or new borrowing. Pigouvian taxes, in contrast, promise to
impose immediate and visible costs on voters. A new tax on gasoline, for
example, is highly visible and inflicts immediate pressure on the voter's
pocketbook-all the more so in the United States, where cars are such an
integral part of everyday life. It is hardly surprising that, given a choice
between hiding costs and making them highly visible, American politicians,

See DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER 422-25, 567-68
72
(1992) (describing energy shortages in Europe and the import of oil from the United States in the
postwar period).
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who are highly responsive to popular opinion on salient issues, have
shunned Pigouvian taxes like the plague. Indeed, Congress has rarely
adopted any type of tax for dealing with widespread environmental and
73
national security problems.
Our proposal does not escape this political problem completely. After
all, the goal of our proposal-and, indeed, of any proposal to raise
petroleum fuel prices-is to create incentives for people to use gasoline
more efficiently. Those who cannot or will not do so will recognize that
they will be penalized under such a measure and will resist it.
2.

Political Advantage of the PFPS Plan: Rational Voters

Even so, our proposal alters this political calculus, particularly if it is
implemented either by adopting a targeted threshold below existing
market prices or by adopting a reset mechanism that shadows increases in
market prices. Under either of these variants of the plan, the PFPS
contributions would have no immediate impact on retail petroleum prices.
The pain associated with the program would be deferred to some indefinite
time in the future. Consequently, the PFPS plan, at least in these versions,
unlike the Pigouvian tax, would not drain voter pocketbooks beyond what
they are already experiencing.
This perception on the part of voters is not solely a function of biases
or heuristics. A rational voter should expect a Pigouvian tax to be costlier
than the PFPS plan. The Pigouvian tax imposes higher costs with a
probability of one as soon as the law takes effect. The PFPS plan, with
either a below-market threshold or a reset mechanism, would impose costs
on the voter with a probability of less than one, and if it did impose higher
costs, this would happen at some uncertain time in the future. Moreover,
any higher costs imposed in the future would be of uncertain durationthe PFPS levy might phase in and out as oil prices fluctuated. Therefore, the
rational voter would necessarily discount the costs of a proposed PFPS
standby levy relative to those of a Pigouvian tax, perhaps by a significant
amount.
What is more, under our proposal all funds raised by the levy would
be refunded to voters. This refund, of course, can also be linked to a
conventional Pigouvian tax. But the typical argument for a carbon tax
proposes to use the revenues for subsidies for mass transit, renewable
energy sources, and the like. Many voters will quite rationally conclude
that this is a losing proposition for them. Money is taken out of the voter's

73
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(reporting that, as of 1998, no major U.S. environmental program relied on pollution taxes as a
control strategy); cf Barthold, supra note 30, at 133-34 (reporting that "the administration,
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pocket and allocated according to a political process that may generate
outcomes the voter regards as having less utility than what the voter would
do with the money. A credible promise to return the money in the form of
periodic PFPS benefit payments should elicit a more favorable response.
Indeed, the prospect of receiving these payments should make the program
more appealing than a Pigouvian tax, particularly for those who expect to
use less than the average amount of gasoline and thus would experience a
net gain from the PFPS program.
3.

Political Advantage of the PFPS Plan: Psychological Heuristics

Although the rational voter would come to this conclusion,
psychological heuristics make our PFPS plan even more appealing
compared with a Pigouvian tax. Because people tend to overestimate their
abilities-so-called optimism bias-some voters will overestimate their
ability to conserve gasoline. Just as everyone is above average in Lake
Wobegon, more than half of voters will expect to be among the half who
74
would earn a net transfer from the PFPS program.
In addition, under the familiar endowment effect, a higher value is
placed on impending losses than on foregone gains. 75 A Pigouvian tax is
plausibly viewed as a loss-money is taken from the voter's pocket and
transferred to the government. The PFPS plan (in its below-market
threshold or reset versions) is more likely to be perceived as a foregone
gain. Such a levy does not take money from the voter's pocket. The voter
continues to pay the same price for gasoline as before. What the voter gives
up is the potentialfuture gain from falling world oil prices. Studies of the
endowment effect suggest that voters will be much less concerned about
this than about an immediate price rise. 76
4.

Interest Groups

We also expect the PFPS plan to attract support from organized
interest groups, perhaps from some unexpected quarters. The auto
industry, for example, may welcome the commitment to a permanent floor

74
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on gasoline prices. American auto companies have been whipsawed by
shifts in consumer demand-from large gas-guzzling cars in the 1960s, to
more efficient compact cars in the 1970s, back again to large vehicles like
SUVs in the 1980s and 1990s, once again toward hybrids and other fuelefficient cars in 2008, and now back again. "'Every six months we get called
stupid for having the wrong products,"' GM Vice Chairman Robert A. Lutz
said after the extreme price oscillations of 2008. "'Far be it from me to be
the first auto executive to call for a gas tax. But right now, it's like fighting
obesity by requiring clothing manufacturers to make nothing but small
77

sizes."'

In contrast, European and Japanese manufacturers have faced a much
more stable consumer demand for fuel-efficient vehicles, given the high
gasoline taxes imposed in their home markets. This means that they have
always had a core of fuel-efficient vehicles in their product lineup, which
they can draw upon in the American market when prices rise. After recent
price swings, American companies (and the UAW) would very likely
welcome a policy commitment that stabilizes American consumer demand
in support of higher fuel efficiency. This would allow American companies
to redesign their fleets without constantly hedging against future demand
for gas guzzlers. 78 Certainly, we would expect American manufacturers, if
offered a choice between the PFPS plan and higher CAFE standards, to
prefer PFPS, since it would afford greater flexibility in redesigning their
vehicle fleets and would allow for production of a broad mix of vehicle
types to meet different consumer needs.
Of course, we would also expect interest group opposition. The airline
industry and travel industry would likely oppose the PFPS program, since
it would increase the cost of flying and at the margin discourage some
travel. Interstate trucking firms would likely oppose the plan, since their
expected costs of doing business in the future would increase, and it is
unclear that they would be able to pass along all these costs to consumers.
Similar points can be made about recreational boat manufacturers, parcel
delivery services, taxi companies, and so forth. 79 And of course the oil
industry would oppose the plan, since it would depress consumer demand
for oil products.
Given these various sources of interest group opposition, one possible
response is to adopt selective exemptions or phase-in provisions. We do
77
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Petrochemical firms and manufacturers that use petroleum in their manufacturing
processes would not likely be opposed, since we assume that petroleum feedstocks, which are not
subject to the federal excise tax, would also be exempt from the PFPS plan.
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not recommend this as a policy matter, since it would undermine the cost
internalization functions of the PFPS plan. But it might be necessary in
order to overcome interest group opposition. For example, diesel fuel, jet
fuel, and motorboat fuel are all separate products subject to different levels
of excise tax under current law. 80 One way to mute opposition from the
trucking industry, for example, would be to exempt diesel fuel, or to adopt
a fractional levy or a phase-in for diesel fuel. 81 Similar points can be made
about jet and motorboat fuel. Special refunds could be provided for taxi
companies or parcel delivery companies that consume large quantities of
gasoline, although it would be administratively costly to devise such
special provisions.
5.

Regional Impact

A particularly difficult political challenge for our proposal is its
potential to favor urban over rural areas. The concern is that people who
live in rural, or even suburban, areas have no choice but to drive longer
distances each day without the option of mass transit. Someone who lives
in rural Montana and commutes thirty miles each way to work will find it
more difficult to conserve gasoline than someone who lives and works near
metro stops in Washington, D.C. As a result, city dwellers are more likely to
receive a net benefit under the program, while those in low-density areas
are more likely to experience a net cost.
While we have proposed a rebate that is geographically uniform, an
adjustment for population density could be considered. One argument for
such an adjustment is that people who live in rural areas generally have
more nondiscretionary driving than people who live in a city. A further
argument is that some negative externalities associated with gasoline
consumption-notably, urban sprawl and traffic congestion-are less
severe in low-density areas. If these considerations are regarded as
persuasive, the size of the PFPS refunds could be varied in inverse
82
proportion to the population density of the zip code of the claimant.
In our view, the policy merits do not justify a density-based
adjustment. Such an adjustment adds to the program's complexity and
reduces the incentive to conserve gasoline by living in denser population
areas with better mass transit. However, including such a feature may be
crucial to winning the support of senators from predominantly rural states,
80
81
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bad from an environmental viewpoint. New generation auto diesel engines burn diesel fuel with
most of the sulfur removed, and get high mileage, rivaling that of hybrids. Diesel cars are currently
selling poorly, primarily because of the high price of diesel fuel relative to gasoline and concerns
about fuel availability.
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and this would be a reasonable compromise to secure passage, especially if
it were transitional and designed to sunset after a period of time. In our
view, a refundable PFPS benefit with a density adjustment would be
considerably better than the status quo.
C.

Policy Advantages of the PFPSPlan over a ClassicPigouvian Tax

In addition to our proposal's political advantages over a classic
Pigouvian tax, it has other advantages as well. It provides a more
permanent price signal than a Pigouvian tax, and this would likely enhance
the incentive effect. In addition, because the PFPS contributions would be
fully refundable, they would not reduce the purchasing power of
consumers as a group-something of particular concern during an
economic contraction. The refund feature also means that the plan can be
tailored to impose only minimal distortions on work and savings decisions
and on the distribution of income.
1.

The PFPS Plan Provides Greater Price Stability

Unlike a classical Pigouvian tax, the PFPS plan imposes a stable floor
on gasoline prices. The PFPS contributions would invisibly rise and fall in
inverse relation to world oil prices, producing a sustained and highly
visible price signal for consumers (at least on the downside). A Pigouvian
tax, in contrast, is tacked on top of market prices, and thus results in fuel
prices fluctuating up and down with changes in the pre-tax price.
Ordinarily, such fluctuations are desirable, since they reflect real changes
in market prices and social costs, which warrant a response from market
participants. For example, we generally want firms to account for volatility
in their inputs when making investments.
Yet there are reasons to believe that highly unpredictable fluctuations
in petroleum fuel prices, such as we witnessed in 2008, can have the effect
of dampening the incentive effects that we want higher fuel prices to
create. The core of the problem is consumer behavior. Consumer decisions
about what kind of automobile to purchase are more significantly affected
by the current price of gasoline than by prices averaged over a longer time
horizon. 83 This does not necessarily suggest that consumers are behaving
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Mike Jackson, Chairman and Chief Executive of the retailer AutoNation Inc.:
You tell me the price of gasoline and I will totally tell you what people will buy and
what trade-offs they will make. They are basically looking for a two- to three-year
payback. So in '08, starting the year at $3 a gallon, everybody talked about fuel efficiency
but nobody really acted. At $4 a gallon, we had the biggest shift in consumer preference
in the history of the business-a stampede to fuel efficiency.... Gasoline is now $2 a
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irrationally. There is evidence that professional energy economists using
sophisticated models have no better track record of predicting future
energy prices than would be had by simply assuming the current price will
prevail in the future.84 Consumers who base automobile purchase
decisions on current gasoline prices may therefore be using as good a
proxy for future prices as is available.
The problem is that, while consumer purchasing decisions can change
on a dime, as energy prices change, decisions by manufacturers about what
options to offer to consumers cannot. Manufacturers require a multi-year
time horizon in developing a product mix that matches consumer
preferences. The same is true of investors in alternative fuels and
technologies. If consumer preferences are highly unstable, reflecting
energy markets that are highly unstable, then manufacturers and investors
faced with long investment horizons must adopt a much higher target rate
of return in order to justify any new investment, whether it be for new car
models or alternative energy sources, in order to compensate for high
uncertainty about future consumer responses. Stabilizing prices would
stabilize consumer preferences, which in turn would permit manufacturers
and investors to adopt a lower target rate of return. This in turn would
produce more investment in energy-saving products and alternatives.8 5
Uncertainty about future prices may also result in additional delay in
making investments in fuel-conserving measures. One common response
to uncertainty about the future is to delay making irretrievable
commitments until some of that uncertainty is resolved. The economic
recession that began in 2008 was in many respects the result of millions of
people delaying decisions to invest (in the broad sense of the word) in
response to high levels of uncertainty.
Motor vehicle manufacturers obviously
make irretrievable
commitments when they decide to build a new model of car, and
alternative fuel suppliers make such commitments when they decide to
gallon, and I have fuel-efficient cars parked in my dealerships as far as the eye can see. I
cannot give them away.
If you just look at the value of a used Prius one year old, at $3 a gallon it is worth
$20,000. At $4 a gallon it is worth $25,000. And at $2 a gallon today it is worth $15,000.
What Price, Green?: AutoNation's Mike Jackson and Edelman's Richard Edelman on How To Get
Consumers Out of Gas Guzzlers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2009, at R4, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123655198432165465.html.
84 See Langer & Miller, supra note 70, at 10 n.37 (referencing studies showing that "the
current spot price of crude oil outperforms sophisticated forecasting models as a predictor of
future spot prices").
85
Absent externalities, we would not be concerned about manufacturers and investors
adopting a higher target rate of return in the face of uncertainty, since uncertainty is a real cost
that should be taken into account in making investment decisions. In the face of significant
externalities, however, there is a social cost rationale for adopting policies that will reduce
uncertainty and hence increase the rate of investment, when there is reason to believe a higher
rate of investment will reduce these externalities.
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build windmill farms. But consumers also make such commitments when
they decide where to live, what kind of car to buy, whether to sign up their
children for a traveling soccer team, and so forth. All of these decisions
entail irretrievable commitments of resources. Anyone facing a high degree
of uncertainty about the future price of gasoline might reasonably adopt a
wait-and-see strategy before committing to a potentially energy-saving
investment. 86 Creating a stable floor under the price of gasoline would
cause many of these potential investors to invest in such savings now,
rather than waiting for further clarification about the movement of prices
in the future. The PFPS plan, which promotes price stability, can therefore
accelerate the process of adopting energy-saving investments, relative to a
conventional Pigouvian tax of the same magnitude.
2.

The PFPS Plan Would Not Diminish Consumer Purchasing Power

One potential concern is that a petroleum fuel tax (and, indeed, any
tax) reduces consumer purchasing power. This slows the economy, which
is a particular concern in an economic downturn. Our proposal would not
have this effect because the revenue collected would be fully refunded.
There would be some redistribution from gas-inefficient taxpayers to gasefficient taxpayers, but net purchasing power should not be affected. The
fiscal impact would be neutral (aside from the program's administrative
costs), whereas a conventional Pigouvian tax creates a fiscal drag.
A further concern is that transportation is an essential precondition to
creating or consuming wealth, and thus the economy might slow down
because the price of a key input into economic activity would rise. This can
be an issue in the short run, but over the long term people should adjust,
whether by moving closer to work, carpooling, buying more gas efficient
cars, or other similar strategies. Our proposal would help the economy
adjust to a future of scarce petroleum. The fact that consumer purchasing
power would be undiminished, moreover, should have an overriding effect.
When people have money to spend, they find a way to spend it.87
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For a general discussion of the value of waiting in capital investment decisions, see

AvINASH IC DIXIT & ROBERT S. PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1994). A dissenting view,
keyed to oil markets, is found in PHILIP K. VERLEGER, JR.,ADJUSTING TO VOLATILE ENERGY PRICES (1993).
Verleger focuses on the effect of price uncertainty on the decision to develop oil reserves. Our

concern, of course, is the effect of price uncertainty on consumer behavior and investment in
energy conservation measures.
87
A possible counterargument would be that targeted subsidies, funded by additional
government borrowing, are an even better strategy from a macroeconomic perspective in an
economic downturn. If a Pigouvian tax has a negative impact, and the PFPS plan is neutral, targeted
subsidies might even have a stimulative impact. This may be the case, although there no doubt are
other stimulus measures that might be even better on this dimension-an issue that is beyond the
scope of this Article. In any event, it is always necessary to make a judgment about micro- and
macroeconomic tradeoffs. The PFPS plan produces strong and positive micro benefits, in the form
of an immediate incentive to begin conserving petroleum fuels on countless margins. A program of
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3.

The PFPS Plan Would Not Diminish Incentives to Work or Save

A standard concern with any tax, of course, is that it might diminish
taxpayer incentives to work or save. An advantage of our PFPS proposal is
that, in general, it would not do so. Unlike a (nonrefundable) Pigouvian tax,
for example, our proposal would impose no net cost on consumers who
consume the average amount of gasoline. As a result, these consumers
would not experience an income effect (and thus would not have a reduced
ability to save). The plan might cause substitution effects, in that people
whose decision to work is at the margin might decide not to do so because
of transportation costs. Yet this outcome would likely be rare, and should
diminish over time, as people adjust to the PFPS program by finding more
gas-efficient ways to commute.
Those whose gas consumption is at the extreme-either very high or
very low-would experience income effects. Those who receive a very high
(or low) net rebate might have reduced (or increased) incentives to work
and increased (or reduced) ability to save. But these would still be
relatively small effects, and they would affect only a subset of the citizenry.
Of course, our proposal could be revised to create greater incentives
to work or save. For instance, like the earned income tax credit, the rebate
could be confined to those who work, thereby increasing incentives to be in
the workforce. Yet this step would alter the distributional impact of the
proposal to the detriment of unemployed and retired people, something we
do not favor.
This modification, though, is an example of a broader goal advocated
by some commentators. They favor using revenue raised through a gas tax
to replace revenue from the least efficient parts of our tax system, so that a
gas tax offers not only the benefit of correcting an externality, but has the
added advantage of reducing deadweight loss from taxation.
We are reluctant to pursue this "double dividend," as it is known in
the literature, 88 for four reasons. First, as previously noted, the revenue
stream generated by our proposal would be very unpredictable because it
would fluctuate with the price of oil. This would make it difficult to
substitute this revenue for that generated by some other tax. Second, if we
subsidies creates no micro benefits in the form of improved incentives, and will have at best only
long-term payoffs if the subsidies produce technological breakthroughs. Moreover, if subsidies for
new energy technologies are packaged with other subsidies for highway and bridge construction,
as under the 2009 Stimulus Bill, then the net impact of the stimulus program may be to encourage
more driving and fuel consumption rather than less. In other words, the micro implications of a

massive stimulus package devoted to "infrastructure investment" may be negative from an energy
policy perspective. This is all the more reason to pair such a program with an energy policy that
creates the right incentives.
88 See, e.g., Wallace E.Oates, Green Taxes: Can We Protect the Environment and Improve
the Tax System at the Same Time?, 61 S. ECON. J.915, 916 (1995); William K.Jaeger, Environmental
Taxation and the Double Dividend,in ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS (Eric Neumayer
ed., 2003), http://www.ecoeco.org/pdf/envtaxanddblediv.pdf.
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were to use the revenue from the PFPS plan to repeal the least efficient
parts of our tax system, we would likely change the distribution of the tax
system, since some of the least efficient tax rules especially burden highincome people (for example, the maximum marginal rate for individuals).
Third, if we were to keep the distributional impact constant, there would
be room to question whether we could, actually, reduce deadweight loss.
This would happen only if the prospect of paying a gas tax does not
discourage labor to the same extent as the prospect of paying income tax or
a broad-based consumption tax, and it is not clear to us why that would
be.8 9

Finally, for reasons of political accountability, we should preserve a
clear link between the revenue collected by the PFPS plan and the rebate
that it funds. Otherwise, if the contribution side of our proposal were
enacted in a compromise that paired it with a tax cut elsewhere in the
system-for instance, a reduction in marginal tax rates-such that the two
elements of the political compromises were not inherently linked, it would
be easier for Congress to reverse the tax cut (for example, by raising
marginal rates not long thereafter) while keeping the revenue from the
contributions. This would be more difficult if the contributions funded
something that was explicitly labeled "PFPS benefits." We discuss concerns
about repeal, and how to address them, in greater detail below.
4.

The PFPS Plan Would Not Be Regressive

Another advantage of our PFPS proposal is that it need not be
regressive-a common concern about nonrefundable Pigouvian gasoline
taxes. It is plausible to assume that low-income taxpayers spend a higher
percentage of their income buying gasoline than high-income taxpayers, so
that, correspondingly, they would spend a higher percentage of their
income on a gas tax. 90 Yet the effect is quite different once we factor in the
benefits side of our proposal. The fact that the benefit amounts would be
89
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J.LEGAL STUD. 667, 680 (1994). For instance, this could be
the case if gasoline were an especially close complement to leisure, so that taxing gasoline
indirectly taxed leisure, but it is not clear that this would be the case since gasoline is, of course,
also used by many to commute to work.
90
Although plausible, it is not clear that this assumption is correct. See James M. Poterba,
Is the Gasoline Tax Regressive?, 5 TAx POL'Y & ECON. 145 (1991) (finding that low-spending
households spend about the same percentage of their income on gasoline as high-spending
households). The standard assumption also focuses only on direct purchases of gasoline, without
also considering indirect purchases in buying goods and services from businesses that use gasoline.
Although low-income taxpayers spend a higher percentage of income on food, whose production is
gasoline-intensive, they spend much less, if anything, on gas-guzzling luxuries such as plane
tickets, taxis, and ski vacations. When all charges-direct and indirect-are considered, it is
possible that petroleum fuel purchases represent a higher percentage of the budget of high-income
taxpayers than of low-income taxpayers. Certainly the high-income taxpayers are spending more
in absolute terms.
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uniform, representing a pro rata share of aggregate collections-such that
low-income and high-income taxpayers would receive the same amountmeans that the program would tend to redistribute from high-income to
low-income taxpayers on a net basis.
To illustrate this point, consider a three-person example 9' in which
gas is selling for two dollars per gallon, the PFPS charge is one dollar per
gallon, and the following other assumptions also hold:
PERSON
A
B
C

INCOME
$20,000
$50,000
$100,000

GAS CONSUMED
500 gallons
600 gallons
700 gallons

BUDGET SHARE
7.5%
3.6%
2.1%

PFPS PAID
$500
$600
$700

In this example, high-income people are assumed to dedicate a lower
percentage of their budgets to gasoline, but to purchase more gas in
absolute terms. 9 2 By itself, the tax is regressive. A has an average tax rate
("ATR") of 2.5%, B has an ATR of 1.2%, and C has an ATR of only 0.7%.
Yet once the rebate is considered, the picture changes dramatically.
The rebate here is $600 (representing the average gas consumption in this
three-person society). Thus, A receives a net payment of $100,
representing a subsidy of 0.5%. B's rebate equals her tax paid, so her ATR
is zero. C has a net cost of $100, and thus has an ATR of 0.1%. The ATR is
thus increasing with income, the mark of a progressive program. The key,
of course, is the uniform rebate, which causes our program to be
progressive in the same way that a consumption tax with a uniform
demogrant can be.
In any event, this program's objective would be to redistribute not
from high-income to low-income taxpayers, but from those who consume
more than the average amount of gasoline to those who consume less. It is
possible that low-income people would have somewhat less flexibility to
respond to this incentive, at least in the short run, since transition costs
may be more daunting for them. They might find it harder to move closer
to work, for instance, or to buy a new, more gas-efficient car. Yet it is not
clear that this would be the case, since low-income people may be more
motivated to respond to the incentive, if only because the dollar amounts at
issue would be a greater inducement for them. Given the diminishing
marginal utility of money, a $100 net refund would loom larger for
someone earning $20,000 than for someone earning $100,000.

91
We are grateful to Bill Gentry for suggesting this example.
92
There is empirical support for this assumption, which requires the income elasticity of
gas consumption to be positive but much less than one (if it were greater than one, the budget
share would increase). See Jonathan E. Hughes, Christopher R. Knittel & Daniel Sperling, Evidence
of a Shift in the Short-Run Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand, ENERGY J., jan. 2008, at 113

(suggesting a consensus medium-run income elasticity of about 0.4).
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It is possible, of course, to make our proposal more favorable to lowincome people. For example, PFPS benefits could be subject to a phase-out,
so that people with incomes above a certain level are not eligible, while the
rest of the population receives a correspondingly larger benefit.
We recommend against a phase-out because it adds to the proposal's
complexity. In addition, as Daniel Shaviro has noted, phase-outs of different
credits can interact in unexpected ways to create very steep marginal
effective tax rates at the phase-out level. 93 More generally, the goal of this
proposal is to encourage conservation and innovation, not to redistribute
income. As Kaplow and Steven Shavell have observed, it is generally less
distortive to redistribute income through the income tax than through
94
regimes with other goals.
The best argument for a phase-out is a political one, since it will keep
opponents of the measure from complaining that multimillionaires will
receive as high a rebate as everyone else. But there obviously also is a
political case against a phase-out, since it will inspire opposition among
high-income taxpayers.
Ill.

Limitations of the PFPS Plan

While our proposal has significant advantages, it is important to
acknowledge four limitations as well, which are discussed in this Part. Two
derive from the concern that the proposal would be undone, in whole or in
part: the first is the risk that some or all of the proposal would be repealed
as soon as the price floor started to bite, and the expectation that this
would happen would dampen the program's incentive effects; the second is
the concern that gas producers would raise prices to a level just above the
threshold, depriving consumers of the refund payments. The other
limitations derive from the narrowness of the proposal: the fact that it
would not correct for the relevant externalities when gas prices are above
the threshold (or, for that matter, perfectly correct for them even when gas
prices decline), and the fact that it would not cover some substitutes for
gasoline that give rise to similar negative externalities.

93 See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Low-Income
Households, 84 TAX NOTES 1191 (1999) (noting that the phase-out of benefit programs functions as
an effective marginal tax rate, and that the fact that these phase-outs are often set at the same level
inadvertently creates very steep effective marginal rates). If the gas rebate phases out at the same
place as various health, education, and child care credits, then each dollar of income at the phaseout level causes the taxpayer not only to pay the regular income tax, but also to lose these credits,
which combine to create a very steep marginal effective tax rate.
94
See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 89, at 674-75.
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A.

Risk of Repeal

As noted above, an advantage of the PFPS plan is its promise of
stability. By maintaining a floor on petroleum fuel prices, the proposal
creates a powerful incentive for consumers and producers to modify
behavior. But the program would not have these beneficial effects if people
expected that, once oil prices began to fall, Congress would repeal the PFPS
plan in order to give constituents the benefits of lower gasoline prices. 95
The risk here is not insubstantial. 96 Once the PFPS plan kicks in and
prevents retail prices from falling in response to declining crude oil prices,
repeal could be characterized as a "tax cut," and indeed repeal would result
in an immediate financial benefit to consumers in the form of lower gas
prices. To be sure, this benefit would be an illusion, or perhaps more
accurately would be transitory, since under our proposal the cut in
contributions would be matched by a loss of PFPS benefits as well. But one
can easily imagine political entrepreneurs seeking to exploit the
appearance that they are the agents of instant relief for consumers.
Gasoline prices are highly visible-they stare you in the face every time
you fill up at the pump-making them perhaps the most salient cost that
consumers incur. Moreover, consumers must pay this cost on a recurring
basis. PFPS benefits, in contrast, would appear in the mailbox only
periodically (for example, once a quarter). Of course, those who are
inefficient users of gas would receive a very real benefit from repeal (at the
expense of those who conserve and thus would receive a net payment
under the program). Given this political dynamic, it would not be unlikely
that politicians would be tempted to exploit asymmetries in perception and
circumstances by agitating for repeal once world oil prices fell far enough
to trigger PFPS charges.
Can we provide an institutional mechanism signaling that repeal
would be less likely? One possibility would be to adopt a supermajority
requirement for any future repeal of PFPS contributions. For example, the
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This point is not new. See Mason Willrich, Energy Independence for America, 52 INT'L

AFF. 53, 62 (1976) (noting that a price floor on oil must be sufficiently high so that "the United
States, having at considerable cost extricated itself from the world market, [is not] turned around
and plunged in once more"); see also Jerry Taylor & Peter Van Doren, An Argument Against Oil Price
Minimums, CATO INST., http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub-id=6410 (last visited Dec. 10,
2009). Of course, if the contribution level is as likely to rise as it is to fall, then risk-neutral
consumers and producers will disregard the change-in-law risk. See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES
CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 27-28 (2000).
Yet we believe repeal will be considered more likely, for the reasons advanced in the text. In
response, we suggest various institutional constraints on repeal. If these are expected to be
effective, then producers and consumers would predict that, if anything, contribution levels would
increase, a prediction that would increase the PFPS program's current impact.
96

For a discussion of the risks of backsliding from commitments made to combat climate

change, see Richard J.Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present
To Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L.REV. 1153 (2009).
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House of Representatives has from time to time adopted rules requiring a
three-fifths majority of those voting to pass an increase in income tax
rates. 97 Similarly, Congress could adopt rules of procedure requiring a
supermajority vote to repeal the PFPS contributions. 98 This would not
guarantee supermajority entrenchment, since Congress could also repeal
the supermajority requirement by majority vote. But any move to repeal
the supermajority requirement would require the separate approval of the
Rules Committee and an affirmative vote in support of a special rule, which
would draw attention to the action and provide an additional fault line on
which opposition could rally. This would provide some additional measure
of assurance that repeal is unlikely.
Alternatively, the government could attempt to "lock box" the PFPS
contributions. For example, Congress could form a wholly owned
governmental entity to segregate these revenues from the rest of the
budget. The entity's only asset would be this revenue stream, and its sole
responsibility would be to work with the IRS to refund the revenue to
taxpayers.
Or, the government could consider entering into specific contractual
guarantees, perhaps with the auto industry, assuring that the contributions
would not be repealed. This would raise the specter of major breach of
contract damages in the event of repeal, which would deter Congress from
considering repeal in response to falling prices. 99 None of these ideas is
fail-safe, of course, but in some combination they might provide additional
assurances against the risk of repeal.
A further concern is the risk that the contributions would not be
rebated, but would be diverted to other ends by Congress. The uncertain
magnitude of the contributions militates against this risk. It is irresponsible
to fund government programs with a revenue stream that is very
unpredictable and may often completely dry up. Also, once the PFPS plan
was in place, any diversion would require cutting or eliminating PFPS
benefit checks that taxpayers would expect to receive when oil prices fall.
The typical household would compare the benefits of the refund it expects
to receive to the benefits from the program that Congress is proposing to
fund, and would likely conclude that it would prefer the cash. This of
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See, e.g., H.R. Res. 5, 105th Cong. § 106(a) (1997).

98
There has been some controversy about the constitutionality of self-imposed
supermajority rules. Compare John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Rights of Legislators
and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitutionality of Legislative
Supermajority Rules, 47 DUKE L.i. 327 (1997) (arguing in favor of constitutionality), with led
Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73 (1996) (arguing against
constitutionality). The better view, we think, is that they are constitutional, on the understanding
that such rules can always be repealed by a majority vote.
99
See Mobil Oil Exploration v. United States, 530 U.S. 604 (2000) (holding that the
United States can be sued in Claims Court for breach of regulatory promise); United States v.
Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (same).
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course is a diffuse sentiment, which may be difficult to organize in
opposition to a concentrated interest arguing for a diversion to some pet
project, like ethanol subsidies. But the loss of the checks may be salient
enough, among enough voters, to discourage politicians from taking this
step.

B.

Avoiding a Windfall to Producers:The Risk That ProducersWould
Capturethe Refund

There is a risk not only that Congress would take the benefit payments
away from consumers, but also that gasoline producers would do so-at
least if the contributions were not structured with care-by not allowing
market prices to fall below the threshold. This concern would arise, for
instance, if the charges were structured so that they would automatically
increase to make up for any difference between the retail price of gasoline
and the target price. With a structure of this sort, consumers would not be
motivated to comparison shop, since they would never pay less than the
target price. For example, if the target price is $3.50 per gallon, a gas
station that charges $3.45 per gallon with a five cent PFPS contribution will
be no more appealing to consumers than one that charges $3.50 per gallon
with no PFPS contribution. As a result, producers would have little
incentive to let pre-contribution prices fall, and collectively they would be
likely to coordinate prices at just above the target price, so that the
government would have no revenue to fund PFPS refunds for
consumers.100
Of course, even if producers were to prop up prices in this way, the
behavioral effects that we intend to create would be preserved. Consumers
still would have the incentive to conserve and experiment with new
technologies, and alternative fuel producers could rely on the stability of
gas prices in making investment decisions. Nevertheless, our goal of
allowing consumers to enjoy the economic benefits of price declinesthrough PFPS benefits, if not directly-would be undercut. 101
The challenge of institutional design is to address this concernensuring that producers have incentives to cut costs and to let the market
price fall, while still assuring the price stability that is needed to encourage
conservation and innovation. We offer two ways to thread this needle.

100
Indeed, the price floor has the unintended effect of facilitating such implicit
coordination by providing gas stations with a focal point, so that each station knows the price at
the pump is supposed to be $3.50-there is no need for a meeting in a smoke-filled roon' to decide
on this level.
This scenario is a variation of the familiar reality that the statutory incidence of a tax
101
or refund may not be the same as its economic incidence. The concern here is that the incidence of
the refund ultimately would lie with producers instead of consumers.
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Basing Charges on Crude Price Instead of Retail Price

First, we propose to compute the charges based on changes in the
price of crude oil as opposed to changes in the retail price at the pump.
This would preserve the benefits of competition among downstream
suppliers, including refiners, interstate pipeline companies, and retail
service stations. Only fluctuations in crude prices, and not the actions of
refiners or service stations, would affect the size of the PFPS contributions.
For example, if a gas station tried to add $0.05 to the price per gallon as a
way to increase its profits, this step would not reduce the size of the PFPS
contribution, which would have already been set based on crude prices.
Since retail prices would not be offset by a decline in the contribution level,
consumers would prefer to buy at service stations that did not attempt to
raise prices in this way. Stations that held the line on prices would attract a
higher sales volume to offset their lower profit margin. Thus, refiners and
distributors would not be able to pad their profits in a way that is invisible
102
to consumers, as long as contribution levels were based on crude prices.
Of course, there would still be the risk that producers of crude oil
would have a diminished incentive to let prices fall. OPEC, in particular,
would have less incentive to allow crude prices to decline if lower prices
would not lead to a higher sales volume in the United States. Nevertheless,
OPEC is subject to two important constraints. First, although it has
significant influence over oil prices, it does not have perfect control
because some members defect and other suppliers are not in the cartel.
Second, assuming that the rest of the world did not adopt our proposal,
consumers outside the United States would benefit from oil price declines
below the threshold. As a result, producers would have an incentive to let
the price fall for these consumers in order to sell more oil. It would be
difficult for OPEC to maintain one price in the United States while letting
the price fall everywhere else. The global nature of the market for oil, then,
gives some comfort that OPEC would not be able to take our proposed
refund away from U.S. consumers.
2.

Adjusting Charges Monthly Instead of Continuously

A second element of our plan that would keep producers from
capturing the refund is that we would adjust the level of PFPS

102
The analysis changes somewhat if the formula for computing the levy makes
assumptions about refining and distribution prices. If these assumptions were updated
periodically, then refiners and producers could hope that, in padding their prices in one period,
they could induce a smaller levy in the next period, leading to the same net price for consumers but
a larger share for themselves. Yet as long as the formula's assumptions are not updated, and are
based instead on historical experience that predates enactment of the levy, this problem would not
arise. Even if the assumptions were updated, then the fact that the levy is recomputed monthly
instead of continuously should constrain producer price gouging, as discussed below.
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contributions only once a month, and not each time oil prices change. This
short-run price fluctuation again would create incentives for consumers to
comparison shop. Since they would keep the full amount of any price
decline in between monthly adjustments, they would favor gas stations
that let the price fall. As a result, gas stations should not be able to cancel
out the PFPS contribution by keeping pre-contribution prices artificially
high.
For example, in setting the contribution level for the month of
February, we would ask what the average pre-contribution price of oil was
on a particular date in January (for example, January 28). The PFPS
contribution would be based on this date alone. Then the PFPS
contribution would remain fixed for the entire month, even as the
103
underlying price of gasoline fluctuated.
The great virtue of this approach is that it would square an important
circle. Not only would it give consumers incentives to monitor and claim
pre-contribution price declines, but it also would preserve consumer and
producer incentives to conserve and to invest in alternative energy. At first
blush, this may not seem to be the case, since the price would be allowed to
fall below the floor (for example, $3.50 per gallon) between monthly
adjustments to the contribution level. Yet the essential point is that these
fluctuations could be in either direction. After the PFPS contribution is set
for the month, the pre-contribution price of gas can go up as well as down,
and there is no reason to expect a systematic bias one way or the other.
So when producers and consumers are making long-term decisions
about which cars to buy or which alternative energy projects to support,
they would know that the price would generally be at least $3.50 on
average-since each month the contribution level would be adjusted to
bring the price back to $3.50, at least initially-and they would know that
the price for the rest of the month could vary, but this variation would be
random instead of systematic. They could not count on a lower price during
the rest of the month, and would be equally likely to pay a higher price than
$3.50. As a result, a system based on monthly adjustments would have the
important virtue 0 4 of creating strong incentives to conserve and invest in

103
A possible concern about a monthly adjustment is that, if prices have increased
during the month, consumers might delay their purchases until the next month, when the PFPS
contribution is expected to be lower; likewise, if prices have declined, they might top off just before
the contribution is recomputed. To blunt this effect, the levy could be recomputed more frequently,
such as every other week or even weekly.
104
Another advantage of adjusting the PFPS contribution monthly, instead of
continuously, is that the program is easier to administer. Continuous recomputations would not be
necessary, and collection would be easier because auditors would need to know only how many
barrels were sold in a given month, and not exactly when each barrel was sold. This is not to say
that a monthly adjustment would be completely free of administrability issues. For instance, if
producers know in advance which day of the month is the measuring date for next month's levy,
they would have an incentive to raise the price on that day. To head off this abuse, the date should
be chosen at random, and after the fact.
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alternative energy, while also preventing gas stations from, in effect, taking
away the consumer's rebate. 105
C.

The ProposalIs Not Sufficiently Comprehensive

A further limitation of our PFPS proposal
comprehensive than an ideal Pigouvian carbon tax.
1.

is that it

is less

Charges Are Too Low at Current and Higher Gas Prices

Obviously, the PFPS program would impose no out-of-pocket cost on
consumers when gas prices are above the threshold. Yet the externalities
that justify a tax, including environmental harms, national security risks,
and congestion costs, still are there. Ideally, the level of a Pigouvian tax is
supposed to reflect the marginal cost of these externalities, but our
proposal obviously is not structured in that way. Indeed, the PFPS
contribution would fluctuate not with the level of the externality, but
inversely with the level of gas prices.
This concern would be particularly pronounced if gas prices were
relatively low at the time this program was enacted. If prices were already
low, they would be unlikely to fall much further, which would mean that
the PFPS charges under our program would be limited in size, and thus
would be less likely to approximate the social harms. Yet even in this
circumstance, having some floor on the price of gasoline would be valuable
in offering at least some stability to expectations. As previously noted, the
program would be better still if it included either a provision for phasing in
increases of target prices or an automatic reset mechanism to increase the
threshold if gas prices rose significantly for an extended period of time.
Even without this sort of built-in mechanism, Congress could always revisit
the threshold if prices rose. Having the price floor in place is an important
first step.

105
Another option, as Donald Susswein has suggested, would be to structure the charge
so that it would not offset the entire gas price decline below the threshold, but only a fraction of it.
See Donald B. Susswein, Will a Floor on Energy Prices Produce Windfall Profits?, 120 TAX NOTES 591
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keep producers from appropriating the contributions, it has the further disadvantage of weakening
the main incentive effects we aim to create: the contributions obviously provide less price support,
and thus less incentive for consumers to conserve and less incentive for investors to support
innovation.

Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn
In an ideal world, we might favor a gas tax that is uniform and at an
adequate level. We agree that such a tax has valuable incentive effects,
since it internalizes the relevant externalities even when gas prices are
above the threshold. Such a tax can also be paired with a refund of the sort
we have described, rendering the tax fiscally neutral. 106 And, of course, if
the tax is structured in this way, producers have incentives to offer the
lowest price, so that the problem described above, of producers in effect
expropriating the refund, does not arise.
Yet, as we have said, we do not believe that a more conventional gas
tax is politically viable in the United States, at least for now. For the reasons
we outlined above, our proposal is more plausible politically. Moreover,
our proposal offers additional benefits relative to a Pigouvian tax: it would
produce price stability, at least in the downward direction, which should
encourage investment in energy conservation; and it would produce an
unreliable revenue stream, reducing the risk of diversion of the revenues to
other government programs, which in turn would further enhance the
plan's political acceptability and ensure its fiscal neutrality. Finally, the
PFPS plan offers a great many of the benefits that a conventional gas tax
provides.
Conceivably, our proposal could serve to pave the way for a more
conventional gas tax. If the public became accustomed to a refundable levy
that is contingent on gas price levels, it might ultimately come to accept
one that is not. Indeed, if the government were able to use this program to
prove its commitment to preserving the refund, it could address an
important voter concern-that politicians will claim the revenue for pet
projects-so that a refundable levy that applies at all price levels might
become an easier political sell.
2.

Petroleum Fuels Only Instead of a Broad-Based Carbon Tax

Finally, there is a second way in which our proposal is too narrow: it
would apply to petroleum fuels, but not to substitutes that also contribute
to environmental harms and national security risks. For example, natural
gas and coal contribute to environmental harms, although domestic
supplies are more plentiful so the national security analysis is different.
An obvious risk of omitting substitutes is that, at the margin, we
would encourage people to substitute one harm, covered by the program,
for another harm that is not For instance, if our program did not apply to
jet fuel (for example, if jet fuel were exempted for political reasons), we

106
Cf. Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, Will a New Administration Mean a New Policy
on Climate Change?, 122 TAx NOTES 625 (2009) (proposing a comprehensive carbon tax that would
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would encourage some to substitute flying for driving, an effect that may
be counterproductive.
Nevertheless, we have limited our proposal to petroleum fuels for
three reasons. First, there already is a federal excise tax on petroleum fuels,
and our proposal can simply be added to the existing administrative
structure. This would make it easier to implement, and also would provide
a principle-building on existing practice-that could be invoked to fend
off claims for additional exemptions. Second, the interest group opposition
to our proposal would be narrower if the proposal was crafted narrowly. If
natural gas were included, for instance, a new set of interest groups would
have strong incentives to oppose it. Finally, the incrementalist philosophy
we invoked above, in discussing the fact that the PFPS program would not
apply above the price threshold, is relevant here as well. It is always
possible to begin with petroleum fuel-an extremely important part of the
problem-and to broaden the measure over time, as it proves to be
workable and gains political acceptance.
Conclusion
This Article has developed an alternative to a Pigouvian carbon tax
that offers many of the advantages of an ideal corrective tax, while offering
political advantages relative to such a tax. Our PFPS plan is structured to
take effect only if the market price of petroleum fuel falls, and any charges
levied are fully refundable to consumers.
The PFPS plan would signal to consumers, auto manufacturers, and
investors in alternative energy technology that petroleum fuel prices will
not appreciably decline in the future. They would respond in a host of ways
that, over time, would reduce America's consumption of oil. The plan offers
a powerful incentive for innovation, but with an appropriately limited role
for government. Unlike the hodgepodge of subsidies and credits currently
under consideration, the PFPS levy does not depend on the government to
determine which technologies will succeed.
If our proposal had been in effect in the summer of 2008, it would
have encouraged consumers to conserve and would have prevented the
failure of a host of alternative energy ventures, while still allowing
consumers to benefit from oil price declines through PFPS benefit
payments. In short, we would have enhanced the security of the nation and
the environment, while enjoying the economic benefits of low gas prices.
Even though oil prices have fallen from their 2008 peak, it is not too late to
enact this program. Setting a price floor even at a relatively low level would
be valuable, and we can either include a mechanism that would
automatically reset the price floor in the future, or we can revisit the floor
later if prices rise again. Putting the program in place is an important step
toward securing the nation's future.

